{"type":"rich","version":"1.0","author_name":"npub10tqt6wdc2neye0cxwyphtre6n5uccgur94khtqjdry9wxhrvywlq6w9uu9","author_url":"https://nostr.ae/npub10tqt6wdc2neye0cxwyphtre6n5uccgur94khtqjdry9wxhrvywlq6w9uu9","provider_name":"njump","provider_url":"https://nostr.ae","html":"📅 Original date posted:2017-07-11\n📝 Original message:Pieter,\n\nI think that you have misrepresented Chris' view by taking it out of\ncontext. His complete quote reads \"If drivechains are successful they\nshould be viewed as the way we scale -- not hard forking the protocol.\"\nChris is comparing Drivechains/sidechains to a hard fork.\n\nYou went on to \"disagree\", but every point of contention you introduced\nwas something that would apply to both drivechain-sourced capacity and\nhardfork-sourced capacity. Neither improves scalability, and both allow\nusers only the opportunity to select a different security model. If I\nunderstand you, the point at which a security model does not become\n\"interesting\" to you, would be the exact same point in the drivechain\nand hardfork worlds. Both, at any rate, have the same effect on\n\"validation cost to auditors\".\n\nThe only true difference is the \"extra risk of miners being able to vote\nto steal your money\", but as I have pointed out on this mailing list\nseveral times, I do not actually believe that there is any marginal risk\n-- miners can already \"vote to steal your money\" in the double-spend and\nln-channel-theft contexts. I have also argued that the \"risk\" is\nactually desirable in an opt-in context, because it puts the burden of\nproof on miners/developers (to convince users that they should move over\nto the sidechain). Since their sidechain coins cannot appreciate in\nvalue relative to the mainchain coins, users would only opt-in if they\nfelt that they were sufficiently compensated for any and all risks.\nHence, it is difficult to list this item as a drawback when, to the\nuser, it is a strict improvement (at least, by any epistemological\nstandard that I can think of). If you have new objections to these\nclaims, I'm sure we would all benefit from hearing them, myself most of all.\n\nPaul\n\n\nOn 7/11/2017 4:01 PM, Pieter Wuille wrote:\n\u003e On Jul 11, 2017 09:18, \"Chris Stewart via bitcoin-dev\"\n\u003e \u003cbitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\n\u003e \u003cmailto:bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e\u003e wrote:\n\u003e\n\u003e     Concept ACK.\n\u003e\n\u003e     If drivechains are successful they should be viewed as the way we\n\u003e     scale\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e I strongly disagree with that statement.\n\u003e\n\u003e Drivechains, and several earlier sidechains ideas, are not a\n\u003e scalability improvement, but merely enabling users to opt-in for\n\u003e another security model.\n\u003e\n\u003e While obviously any future with wider adoption will need different\n\u003e technologies that have different trade-offs, and anyone is free to\n\u003e choose their security model, I don't think this particular one is\n\u003e interesting. In terms of validation cost to auditors, it is as bad as\n\u003e just a capacity increase on chain, while simultaneously adding the\n\u003e extra risk of miners being able to vote to steal your money.\n\u003e\n\u003e Cheers,\n\u003e\n\u003e -- \n\u003e Pieter\n\u003e\n\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20170711/3fa37fbd/attachment.html\u003e"}