{"type":"rich","version":"1.0","author_name":"npub1azvhdrf9fu6n0tm7yez4j6zcxcedp2ct6nrcq3z74naqs7kgpk8s5t2krq","author_url":"https://nostr.ae/npub1azvhdrf9fu6n0tm7yez4j6zcxcedp2ct6nrcq3z74naqs7kgpk8s5t2krq","provider_name":"njump","provider_url":"https://nostr.ae","html":"📅 Original date posted:2015-08-29\n📝 Original message:In principle I am sympathetic to dynamic block size proposals...but in\npractice it seems we're barking up the wrong tree. Without mechanisms for\nincentivizing validators...and checks and balances between the interests of\nregular users (who want to reduce fees and confirmation time), miners (who\nwant to balance hashing and propagation time costs with revenue), and\nvalidator nodes (who currrently lack any direct incentives), I think we're\ntalking about significant protocol complications with potential benefits\nthat are hard to model at best.\n\nOn Sat, Aug 29, 2015, 3:16 AM Btc Drak via bitcoin-dev \u003c\nbitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e wrote:\n\n\u003e On Sat, Aug 29, 2015 at 1:29 AM, Mark Friedenbach via bitcoin-dev\n\u003e \u003cbitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e wrote:\n\u003e \u003e Ah, then my mistake. It seemed so similar to an idea that was proposed\n\u003e \u003e before on this mailing list:\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2015-May/008033.html\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e that my mind just filled in the gaps. I concur -- having miners -- or any\n\u003e \u003e group -- vote on block size is not an intrinsically good thing. The the\n\u003e \u003e original proposal due to Greg Maxwell et al was not a mechanism for\n\u003e \"voting\"\n\u003e \u003e but rather a feedback control that made the maximum block size that which\n\u003e \u003e generated the most fees.\n\u003e\n\u003e Mark and Jorge,\n\u003e\n\u003e I am very glad you have brought up this particular objection because\n\u003e it's something I thought about but was unclear if it was an opinion\n\u003e that would be shared by others. I chose to omit it from the proposal\n\u003e to see if it would come up during peer review.\n\u003e\n\u003e I feel that giving miners a blank cheque to increase blocksize, by any\n\u003e means, goes against a key design of bitcoin's security model. Full\n\u003e nodes keep miners honest by ensuring by validating their blocks. Under\n\u003e any voting-only scheme there is no way for full nodes to keep miners\n\u003e in cheque because miner have free reign to increase the blocksize.\n\u003e\n\u003e This problem can be solved by introducing a hard cap on blocksize. By\n\u003e introducing an upper limit miners now have the freedom to increase\n\u003e blocksize but only within defined parameters.  Remember my proposal\n\u003e allows blocksize to increase and decrease in such a way that miners\n\u003e must collectively agree if they want the size to increase.\n\u003e\n\u003e I believe the idea of a hard upper limit has become rather politicised\n\u003e but is essential to the security model of bitcoin.\n\u003e\n\u003e With respect to the flexicap idea where miners can create a larger\n\u003e block by paying extra difficulty, I believe that proposal has a\n\u003e critical flaw because, as Gavin pointed out, it makes it very\n\u003e expensive (and risky) to include a few extra transactions. I believe\n\u003e it suffers from tragedy of the commons because there is no incentive\n\u003e for the mining community to reach consensus. Each and every block is\n\u003e going to be a gamble, \"should we include a few extra transactions at\n\u003e the risk of losing the block?\". Under my proposal miners can\n\u003e collectively agree to change the blocksize. Let's say they want a 10%\n\u003e increase, they can collude together to make that increase and once\n\u003e reached, it remains until they want to change it again. Yet, the upper\n\u003e hard limit keeps the ultimate control of the maximum block size\n\u003e squarely in the hands of full nodes.\n\u003e\n\u003e Whilst the exact number may be up for discussion, I would propose an\n\u003e initial upper limit of 8MB, so under my proposal the blocksize would\n\u003e be flexible between 1MB and 8MB.\n\u003e\n\u003e An alternative methodology to voting in the coinbase would be to\n\u003e change the vote to be the blocksize itself\n\u003e\n\u003e 1. miners pay extra difficulty to create a larger block.\n\u003e 2. every 2016 blocks the average or median of the last 2016 blocks is\n\u003e calculated and becomes the new maximum blocksize limit.\n\u003e\n\u003e This would retain incentive to collude to increase blocksize, as well\n\u003e as the property of costing to increase while being free to propose\n\u003e decrease.\n\u003e\n\u003e It would still require an upper blocksize limit in order for full\n\u003e nodes to retain control. Without an upper limit, any proposal is going\n\u003e to break the security model as full nodes give up some oversight\n\u003e control over miners.\n\u003e\n\u003e Another way of looking at these ideas is we're raising blocksize hard\n\u003e limit (to 8MB or whatever is decided), but making a soft of \"softer\"\n\u003e or inner limit part of consensus. Such a concept is not really\n\u003e departing from the current idea of a soft limit except to make it\n\u003e consensus enforced. Obviously it's not identical, but I think you can\n\u003e see the similarities.\n\u003e\n\u003e Does that make sense?\n\u003e _______________________________________________\n\u003e bitcoin-dev mailing list\n\u003e bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\n\u003e https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev\n\u003e\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20150829/ec6361bf/attachment-0001.html\u003e"}