{"type":"rich","version":"1.0","author_name":"npub1287e20y3ple0k202xuas3h9h0yfx6ravfxcycd9jauan8cne9pusj45an7","author_url":"https://nostr.ae/npub1287e20y3ple0k202xuas3h9h0yfx6ravfxcycd9jauan8cne9pusj45an7","provider_name":"njump","provider_url":"https://nostr.ae","html":"📅 Original date posted:2022-04-27\n📝 Original message:\u003e\u003e we should not let the wealthy make consensus decisions.\n\n\u003eWe shouldn't let the wealthy continue to control our governments. However,\nbitcoin is not a government. Its a financial network.\n\u003eThe fact of the matter is that fundamentally, the economic majority\ncontrols where the chain goes. Its very likely that the wealthy\n\u003eare disproportionately represented in the economic majority. Attempting to\nsubvert the economic majority seems like a bad idea.\n\u003eThe reality of control there will come out one way or another, and being\nhonest about it is probably the best way to avoid major schisms in the\nfuture.\n\nYes, the economic majority is important:  Who else has more incentive to\nprotect the security and thus the value embodied in the network than people\nwho have invested money and time in the network?  A group of people with\n1/10/100/1000 bitcoins each has more economic incentive to do so than a\nsimilar sized group with 1/10/100/1000 satoshis each.  Likewise, it is\nsignificantly easier to mobilize 1 million people \"voting\" with 100\nsatoshis each - a total of 1 BTC -  vs 10000 people each voting with 100\nbitcoins each - a total of 1 million BTC.  I don't think anyone would say\nthat even if those 1 million people, for example, thought that we should\nincrease the number of bitcoins via perpetual inflation it would be a good\nidea to listen to it however the vote was done whether via transaction\nflags or something else.  Of course they could fork off.\n\nCheers,    :-)\nChris\n\n\n\n\n\nOn Wed, Apr 27, 2022 at 4:11 AM Billy Tetrud via bitcoin-dev \u003c\nbitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e wrote:\n\n\u003e \u003e   A transaction signaling in the affirmative MUST NOT be included in a\n\u003e block that does not signal in the affirmative\n\u003e\n\u003e I feel like I've heard this idea somewhere before. Its an interesting\n\u003e idea.\n\u003e\n\u003e It should be noted that there is a consequence of this: holders wouldn't\n\u003e have much say. People that transact a lot (or happen to be transacting a\n\u003e lot during the signaling time period) would have a very disproportionate\n\u003e ability to pressure miners than people who aren't transacting much. This\n\u003e would probably be a pretty good proxy for future mining revenue that\n\u003e supports (or is against) a particular thing. However, the network does do\n\u003e more than just transact, so I would be a bit worried that such a mechanism\n\u003e would bias the system towards things that are good for transactors and bad\n\u003e for holders. Things like more coin inflation, larger blocks, etc.\n\u003e\n\u003e Another consideration is that miners are already incentivized to follow\n\u003e the money here. Adding an *additional* incentive might be distorting the\n\u003e market, so to speak.\n\u003e\n\u003e An alternative I proposed was a way to do weighted polling of holders:\n\u003e\n\u003e https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2022-March/020146.html\n\u003e\n\u003e The polling wouldn't be directly connected to the activation mechanism in\n\u003e any way, but would just be a mechanism to gauge some portion of consensus.\n\u003e If enough people were involved, theoretically it could be hooked up to\n\u003e activation, but I would be pretty wary of doing that directly as well.\n\u003e\n\u003e \u003e we should not let the wealthy make consensus decisions.\n\u003e\n\u003e We shouldn't let the wealthy continue to control our governments. However,\n\u003e bitcoin is not a government. Its a financial network. The fact of the\n\u003e matter is that fundamentally, the economic majority controls where the\n\u003e chain goes. Its very likely that the wealthy are disproportionately\n\u003e represented in the economic majority. Attempting to subvert the economic\n\u003e majority seems like a bad idea. The reality of control there will come out\n\u003e one way or another, and being honest about it is probably the best way to\n\u003e avoid major schisms in the future.\n\u003e\n\u003e \u003e Does a scheme like this afford us a better view into consensus than we\n\u003e have today?\n\u003e\n\u003e It does more than provide a view. It directly changes the game theory\n\u003e around how activation works. If we wanted to simply get a better view into\n\u003e consensus, we could allow the same thing, but allow any block to mine any\n\u003e transaction regardless of transaction signaling. Then it would be more\n\u003e purely informational.\n\u003e\n\u003e \u003e Can it be gamed to give us a *worse* view into consensus? How?\n\u003e \u003e Does it measure the right thing? If not, what do you think is the right\n\u003e thing to measure?\n\u003e\n\u003e Doesn't seem like it could be gamed, but as I mentioned above, the honest\n\u003e mechanics of it might be themselves undesirably distorting.\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e On Tue, Apr 26, 2022 at 3:49 PM Bryan Bishop via bitcoin-dev \u003c\n\u003e bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e wrote:\n\u003e\n\u003e\u003e You may be interested in these posts on transaction signalling:\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-April/014193.html\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-April/014202.html\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-May/014251.html\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e On Tue, Apr 26, 2022 at 3:12 PM Keagan McClelland via bitcoin-dev \u003c\n\u003e\u003e bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e wrote:\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e Hi all,\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e Alongside the debate with CTV right now there's a second debate that was\n\u003e\u003e\u003e not fully hashed out in the activation of Taproot. There is a lot of\n\u003e\u003e\u003e argument around what Speedy Trial is or isn't, what BIP8 T/F is or isn't\n\u003e\u003e\u003e etc. A significant reason for the breakdown in civility around this debate\n\u003e\u003e\u003e is that because we don't have a means of measuring user support for\n\u003e\u003e\u003e proposed sof-fork changes, it invariably devolves into people claiming that\n\u003e\u003e\u003e their circles support/reject a proposal, AND that their circles are more\n\u003e\u003e\u003e broadly representative of the set of Bitcoin users as a whole.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e It seems everyone in this forum has at one point or another said \"I\n\u003e\u003e\u003e would support activation of ____ if there was consensus on it, but there\n\u003e\u003e\u003e isn't\". This statement, in order to be true, requires that there exist a\n\u003e\u003e\u003e set of conditions that would convince you that there is consensus. People\n\u003e\u003e\u003e have tried to dodge this question by saying \"it's obvious\", but the reality\n\u003e\u003e\u003e is that it fundamentally isn't. My bubble has a different \"obvious\" answer\n\u003e\u003e\u003e than any of yours.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e Secondly, due to the trauma of the block size wars, no one wants to\n\u003e\u003e\u003e utter a statement that could imply that miners have any influence over what\n\u003e\u003e\u003e rulesets get activated or don't. As such \"miner signaling\" is consistently\n\u003e\u003e\u003e devalued as a signal for market demand. I don't think this is reasonable\n\u003e\u003e\u003e since following the events of '17  miners are aware that they have the\n\u003e\u003e\u003e strong incentive that they understand market demand. Nevertheless, as it\n\u003e\u003e\u003e stands right now the only signal we have to work with is miner signaling,\n\u003e\u003e\u003e which I think is rightly frustrating to a lot of people.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e So how can we measure User Support for a proposed rule change?\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e I've had this idea floating around in the back of my head for a while,\n\u003e\u003e\u003e and I'd like to solicit some feedback here. Currently, all forms of\n\u003e\u003e\u003e activation that are under consideration involve miner signaling in one form\n\u003e\u003e\u003e or another. What if we could make it such that users could more directly\n\u003e\u003e\u003e pressure miners to act on their behalf? After all, if miners are but the\n\u003e\u003e\u003e humble servants of user demands, this should be in alignment with how\n\u003e\u003e\u003e people want Bitcoin to behave.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e Currently, the only means users have of influencing miner decisions are\n\u003e\u003e\u003e A. rejection of blocks that don't follow rules and B. paying fees for\n\u003e\u003e\u003e transaction inclusion. I suggest we combine these in such a way that\n\u003e\u003e\u003e transactions themselves can signal for upgrade. I believe (though am not\n\u003e\u003e\u003e certain) that there are \"free\" bits in the version field of a transaction\n\u003e\u003e\u003e that are presently ignored. If we could devise a mapping between some of\n\u003e\u003e\u003e those free bits, and the signaling bits in the block header, it would be\n\u003e\u003e\u003e possible to have rules as follows:\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - A transaction signaling in the affirmative MUST NOT be included in a\n\u003e\u003e\u003e block that does not signal in the affirmative\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - A transaction that is NOT signaling MAY be included in a block\n\u003e\u003e\u003e regardless of that block's signaling vector\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - (Optional) A transaction signaling in the negative MUST NOT be\n\u003e\u003e\u003e included in a block that signals in the affirmative\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e Under this set of conditions, a user has the means of sybil-resistant\n\u003e\u003e\u003e influence over miner decisions. If a miner cannot collect the fees for a\n\u003e\u003e\u003e transaction without signaling, the user's fee becomes active economic\n\u003e\u003e\u003e pressure for the miner to signal (or not, if we include some variant of the\n\u003e\u003e\u003e negative clause). In this environment, miners could have a better view into\n\u003e\u003e\u003e what users do want, as would the Bitcoin network at large.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e Some may take issue with the idea that people can pay for the outcome\n\u003e\u003e\u003e they want and may try to compare a method like this to Proof of Stake, but\n\u003e\u003e\u003e there are only 3 sybil resistant mechanisms I am aware of, and any \"real\"\n\u003e\u003e\u003e view into what social consensus looks like MUST be sybil resistant:\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - Hashpower\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - Proof of personhood (KYC)\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - Capital burn/risk\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e Letting hashpower decide this is the thing that is currently\n\u003e\u003e\u003e contentious, KYC is dead on arrival both on technical and social grounds,\n\u003e\u003e\u003e which really just leaves some means of getting capital into the process of\n\u003e\u003e\u003e consensus measurement. This mechanism I'm proposing is measurable\n\u003e\u003e\u003e completely en-protocol and doesn't require trust in institutions that fork\n\u003e\u003e\u003e futures would. Additionally it could be an auxiliary feature of the soft\n\u003e\u003e\u003e fork deployment scheme chosen making it something you could neatly package\n\u003e\u003e\u003e all together with the deployment itself.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e There are many potential tweaks to the design I propose above:\n\u003e\u003e\u003e 1. Do we include a notion of negative signaling (allowing for the\n\u003e\u003e\u003e possibility of rejection)\n\u003e\u003e\u003e 2. Do we make it such that miner signaling must be congruent with \u003eX% of\n\u003e\u003e\u003e transactions, where congruence is that the signal must match any\n\u003e\u003e\u003e non-neutral signal of transaction.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e Some anticipated objections:\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e 1. signaling isn't voting, no deployment should be made without\n\u003e\u003e\u003e consensus first.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - yeah well we can't currently measure consensus right now, so that's\n\u003e\u003e\u003e not a super helpful thing to say and is breeding ground for abuse in the\n\u003e\u003e\u003e form of certain people making the unsubstantiated claim that consensus does\n\u003e\u003e\u003e or does not exist for a particular initiative\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e 2. This is just a proposal for \"pay to play\", we should not let the\n\u003e\u003e\u003e wealthy make consensus decisions.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - I agree that wealth should not be able to strong-arm decision making.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e But the status quo seems even worse where we let publicly influential\n\u003e\u003e\u003e people decide consensus in such a way where not only do they not \"lose\n\u003e\u003e\u003e ammunition\" in the process of campaigning, but actually accrue it, creating\n\u003e\u003e\u003e really bad long-term balances of power.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e 3. Enforcing this proposal requires its own soft fork.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - Yes. It does...and there's a certain cosmic irony to that, but before\n\u003e\u003e\u003e we consider how to make this happen, I'd like to even discuss whether or\n\u003e\u003e\u003e not it's a good idea.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e 4. This gives CoinJoin pool operators and L2 protocol implementations\n\u003e\u003e\u003e power over deciding consensus.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - I see this as an improvement over the status quo\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e 5. This encourages \"spam\"\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - If you pay the fees, it's not spam.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e The biggest question I'd like to pose to the forum is:\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - Does a scheme like this afford us a better view into consensus than we\n\u003e\u003e\u003e have today?\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - Can it be gamed to give us a *worse* view into consensus? How?\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - Does it measure the right thing? If not, what do you think is the\n\u003e\u003e\u003e right thing to measure? (assuming we could)\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - Should I write a BIP spec'ing this out in detail?\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e Cheers,\n\u003e\u003e\u003e Keagan\n\u003e\u003e\u003e _______________________________________________\n\u003e\u003e\u003e bitcoin-dev mailing list\n\u003e\u003e\u003e bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\n\u003e\u003e\u003e https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e --\n\u003e\u003e - Bryan\n\u003e\u003e https://twitter.com/kanzure\n\u003e\u003e _______________________________________________\n\u003e\u003e bitcoin-dev mailing list\n\u003e\u003e bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\n\u003e\u003e https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e _______________________________________________\n\u003e bitcoin-dev mailing list\n\u003e bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\n\u003e https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev\n\u003e\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20220427/815a5da9/attachment-0001.html\u003e"}