{"type":"rich","version":"1.0","author_name":"npub1dw88wd5gqsqn6ufxhf9h03uk8087l7gfzdtez5csjlt6pupu4pwsj8plrw","author_url":"https://nostr.ae/npub1dw88wd5gqsqn6ufxhf9h03uk8087l7gfzdtez5csjlt6pupu4pwsj8plrw","provider_name":"njump","provider_url":"https://nostr.ae","html":"📅 Original date posted:2017-10-01\n📝 Original message:Given the proposed fixed signature size, It seems better to me that we\ncreate a SIGHASH_WITNESS_WEIGHT flag as opposed to SIGHASH_WITNESS_DEPTH.\n\nMark, you seem to be arguing that in general we still want weight\nmalleability even with witness depth fixed, but I don't understand in what\nscenario we would want that.\n\nIt strikes me that is most scenarios all parties signing an input would do\nso after an execution path through the script has been agreed upon by all\nparties, in which case the witness weight can be fixed.\nIn rare cases where the smart contract requires that some parties sign in\nadvance of the decision about the execution path (for example, I'm thinking\nabout delegation here, but I want to keep my remarks general), we wouldn't\nwant to fix the witness depth either.\n\nA SIGHASH_WITNESS_WEIGHT would prevent all possible malleability that would\nmodify the transaction's fee/weight priority (at least for that one input),\nand greatly reduce the overall attack surface of witness malleability\nissues.\n\nOn Sun, Oct 1, 2017 at 1:04 AM, Mark Friedenbach via bitcoin-dev \u003c\nbitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e wrote:\n\n\u003e Clean stack should be eliminated for other possible future uses, the most\n\u003e obvious of which is recursive tail-call for general computation capability.\n\u003e I’m not arguing for that at this time, just arguing that we shouldn’t\n\u003e prematurely cut off an easy implementation of such should we want to. Clean\n\u003e stack must still exist as policy for future soft-fork safety, but being a\n\u003e consensus requirement was only to avoid witness malleability, which\n\u003e committing to the size of the witness also accomplishes.\n\u003e\n\u003e Committing to the number of witness elements is fully sufficient, and\n\u003e using the number of elements avoids problems of not knowing the actual size\n\u003e in bytes at the time of signing, e.g. because the witness contains a merkle\n\u003e proof generated by another party from an unbalanced tree, and unbalanced\n\u003e trees are expected to be common (so that elements can be placed higher in\n\u003e the tree in accordance with their higher expected probability of usage).\n\u003e Other future extensions might also have variable-length proofs.\n\u003e\n\u003e \u003e On Sep 30, 2017, at 7:47 PM, Luke Dashjr \u003cluke at dashjr.org\u003e wrote:\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e Should it perhaps commit to the length of the serialised witness data\n\u003e instead\n\u003e \u003e or additionally? Now that signatures are no longer variable-length,\n\u003e that'd be\n\u003e \u003e possible...\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e As far as tail-call needs are concerned, CLEANSTACK wouldn't have been\n\u003e checked\n\u003e \u003e until AFTER the tail-call in the first draft. But I suppose eliminating\n\u003e it for\n\u003e \u003e other possible future purposes is still useful.\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e Luke\n\u003e\n\u003e _______________________________________________\n\u003e bitcoin-dev mailing list\n\u003e bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\n\u003e https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev\n\u003e\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20171001/61186661/attachment.html\u003e"}