{"type":"rich","version":"1.0","author_name":"npub1fx98zxt3lzspjs5f4msr0fxysx5euucm29ghysryju7vpc9j0jzqtcl2d8","author_url":"https://nostr.ae/npub1fx98zxt3lzspjs5f4msr0fxysx5euucm29ghysryju7vpc9j0jzqtcl2d8","provider_name":"njump","provider_url":"https://nostr.ae","html":"📅 Original date posted:2017-04-08\n📝 Original message:To be more specific, why \"being higher will secure the Bitcoin network\nbetter against newer optimizations\"?\nOr, to be more clear, let's forget about future \"optimizations\", let's\njust think of an attacker. Does asicboost being used by all miners\nmake the system more secure against an attacker? No, for the attacker\ncan use asicboost too.\nWhat about the case when not all the miners are using asicboost? Then\nthe attacker can actually get an advantage by suing asicboost.\n\nSometimes people compare asicboost with the use of asics in general as\nboth providing more security for the network and users. But I don't\nthink this is accurate. The existence of sha256d asics makes an attack\nwith general purpose computing hardware (or even more specialized\narchitectures like gpgpu) much more expensive and unlikely. As an\nalternative the attacker can spend additional resources investing in\nasics himself (again, making many attacks more expensive and\nunlikely).\n\nBut as far as I know, asicboost can be implemented with software\nrunning on general purpose hardware that integrates with regular\nsha256d asics. There is probably an advantage on having the asicboost\nimplementation \"in the same box\" as the sha256d, yet again the\nattacker can invest in hardware with the competitive advantage from\nhaving asicboost more intergrated with the sha256d asics too.\n\nTo reiterate, whether all miners use asicboost or only a subset of\nthem, I remain unconvinced that provides any additional security to\nthe network (to be more precise whether that makes \"tx history harder\nto rewrite\"), even if it results on the hashrate charts looking \"more\nsecure\".\n\n\nOn Sat, Apr 8, 2017 at 6:27 PM, Jorge Timón \u003cjtimon at jtimon.cc\u003e wrote:\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e On 8 Apr 2017 5:06 am, \"Jimmy Song via bitcoin-dev\"\n\u003e \u003cbitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e wrote:\n\u003e\n\u003e Praxeology Guy,\n\u003e\n\u003e\u003e Why would the actual end users of Bitcoin (the long term and short term\n\u003e\u003e owners of bitcoins) who run fully verifying nodes want to change Bitcoin\n\u003e\u003e policy in order to make their money more vulnerable to 51% attack?\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e Certainly, if only one company made use of the extra nonce space, they would\n\u003e have an advantage. But think of it this way, if some newer ASIC optimization\n\u003e comes up, would you rather have a non-ASICBoosted hash rate to defend with\n\u003e or an ASICBoosted hash rate? Certainly, the latter, being higher will secure\n\u003e the Bitcoin network better against newer optimizations.\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e Why?"}