{"type":"rich","version":"1.0","author_name":"npub17cwk7hm623dm5npjzu8cvv994h43k2keanegs8w78xyvlez8hqqsqqmtzy","author_url":"https://nostr.ae/npub17cwk7hm623dm5npjzu8cvv994h43k2keanegs8w78xyvlez8hqqsqqmtzy","provider_name":"njump","provider_url":"https://nostr.ae","html":"📅 Original date posted:2020-03-04\n📝 Original message:Hello,\n\nI noticed recently that a PR to Bitcoin Core that pretty much touched\neverything my BIP-322 pull request touches (around the same\ncomplexity) was merged without a thought given to BIP-322\ncompatibility, despite the BIP-322 PR being open for 2x the time. I\ncan only conclude from this that people dislike BIP-322 in its current\nform, which the 9 month old pull request stagnating can probably\nattest to.\n\nThere are several things that I can do to make this a bit more\nappealing to people, which would hopefully kick the progress on this\nforward. I have already put in a non-trivial amount of energy and\neffort into maintaining the pull request as is, so I'd prefer if\npeople were harsh and unfiltered in their criticism rather than polite\nand buffered, so I can beat this thing into shape (or abandon it, in\nthe worst case).\n\n=============\n1. People use signmessage as a way to prove funds. This is misleading\nand should be discouraged; throw the sign message stuff out and\nreplace it entirely with a prove funds system.\n\nI know in particular luke-jr is of this opinion, and Greg Maxwell in\nhttps://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/16440#issuecomment-568194168\nleans towards this opinion as well, it seems.\n\n=============\n2. Use a transaction rather than a new format; make the first input's\ntxid the message hash to ensure the tx cannot be broadcasted. This has\nthe benefit of being able to provide to an existing hardware wallet\nwithout making any modifications to its firmware.\n\nI think Mark Friedenbach and Johnson Lau are of this opinion, except\nJohnson Lau also suggests that the signature hash is modified, see\nhttps://github.com/bitcoin/bips/pull/725#issuecomment-420040430 --\nwhich defeats the benefit above since now hw wallets can no longer\nsign.\n\nPrusnak (I think he works at Trezor; apologies if I am mistaken) is\nagainst this idea, and proposes (3) below:\nhttps://github.com/bitcoin/bips/pull/725#issuecomment-420210488\n\n=============\n3. Use Trezor style\n\nSee https://github.com/trezor/trezor-mcu/issues/169\n\nThis has the benefit of already being adopted (which clearly BIP-322\nis failing hard at right now), but has the drawback that we can no\nlonger do *generic* signing; we are stuck with the exact same\nlimitations as in the legacy system, which we kinda wanted to fix in\nthe updated version.\n\n=============\n4. Introduce OP_MESSAGEONLY\n\nQuoting Johnson Lau at\nhttps://github.com/bitcoin/bips/pull/725#issuecomment-420421058 :\n\"\"\"\nOP_MESSAGEONLY means the script following the code would never be\nvalid. For example, a scriptPubKey:\n\nOP_IF OP_MESSAGEONLY \u003ckey_m\u003e OP_ELSE \u003ckey_s\u003e OP_ENDIF OP_CHECKSIG\n\nFor messaging purpose, OP_MESSAGEONLY is considered as OP_NOP and is\nignored. A message could be signed with either key_m or key_s.\n\nFor spending, only key_s is valid.\n\nI don't think it is a big problem to consume a op_code. If this is a\nreal concern, I could modify it as follow: in message system,\nOP_RETURN will pop the top stack. If top stack is msg in hex, it is\nignored. Otherwise, the script fails.\n\"\"\"\n\n=============\n5. Some other solution"}