{"type":"rich","version":"1.0","author_name":"npub1y22yec0znyzw8qndy5qn5c2wgejkj0k9zsqra7kvrd6cd6896z4qm5taj0","author_url":"https://nostr.ae/npub1y22yec0znyzw8qndy5qn5c2wgejkj0k9zsqra7kvrd6cd6896z4qm5taj0","provider_name":"njump","provider_url":"https://nostr.ae","html":"📅 Original date posted:2017-04-09\n📝 Original message:Curious: I'm not sure why a serious discussion of POW change is not on the\ntable as a part of a longer-term roadmap.\n\nDone right, a ramp down of reliance on SHA-256 and a ramp-up on some of the\nproven, np-complete graph-theoretic or polygon manipulation POW would keep\nBitcoin in commodity hardware and out of the hands of centralized\nmanufacturing for many years.\n\nClearly a level-playing field is critical to keeping centralization from\nbeing a \"defining feature\" of Bitcoin over the long term.   I've heard the\nterm \"level playing field\" bandied about quite a bit.   And it seems to me\nthat the risk of state actor control and botnet attacks is less than\nstate-actor manipulation of specialized manufacturing of \"SHA-256 forever\"\nhardware.   Indeed, the reliance on a fairly simple hash seems less and\nless likely a \"feature\" and more of a baggage.\n\nPerhaps regular, high-consensus POW changes might even be *necessary* as a\npart of good maintenance of cryptocurrency in general.   Killing the\nexisting POW, and using an as-yet undefined, but deployment-bit ready POW\nfield to flip-flop between the current and the \"next one\" every 8 years or\nor so, with a ramp down beginning in the 7th year....  A stub function that\nis guaranteed to fail unless a new consensus POW is selected within 7\nyears.\n\nSomething like that?\n\nHaven't thought about it *that* much, but I think the network would respond\nwell to a well known cutover date.   This would enable rapid-response to\nquantum tech, or some other needed POW switch as well... because the\nmechanisms would be in-place and ready to switch as needed.\n\nLots of people seem to panic over POW changes as \"irresponsible\", but it's\nonly irresponsible if done irresponsibly.\n\n\nOn Fri, Apr 7, 2017 at 9:48 PM, praxeology_guy via bitcoin-dev \u003c\nbitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e wrote:\n\n\u003e Jimmy Song,\n\u003e\n\u003e Why would the actual end users of Bitcoin (the long term and short term\n\u003e owners of bitcoins) who run fully verifying nodes want to change Bitcoin\n\u003e policy in order to make their money more vulnerable to 51% attack?\n\u003e\n\u003e If anything, we would be making policy changes to prevent the use of\n\u003e patented PoW algorithms instead of making changes to enable them.\n\u003e\n\u003e Thanks,\n\u003e Praxeology Guy\n\u003e\n\u003e _______________________________________________\n\u003e bitcoin-dev mailing list\n\u003e bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\n\u003e https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev\n\u003e\n\u003e\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20170409/d885a90e/attachment.html\u003e"}