{"type":"rich","version":"1.0","author_name":"npub1kf0ppcjaguxekg24yx6smgxlu73qn0k8lm0t2wrqc0scpl7u3sgsmf3f58","author_url":"https://nostr.ae/npub1kf0ppcjaguxekg24yx6smgxlu73qn0k8lm0t2wrqc0scpl7u3sgsmf3f58","provider_name":"njump","provider_url":"https://nostr.ae","html":"📅 Original date posted:2015-06-14\n📝 Original message:Miner voting, while imperfect, is the least-worst of various solutions\nwhich inject market input into the system.  It is is known quantity, field\ntested, and must be sustained, in public, over a time span of months.  As\nthis thread shows, stakeholder and direct user voting is nigh impossible to\nget right.\n\nChoosing block size is fundamentally a central bank directive shaping the\nfee market.  Whatever actor or algorithm or natural equilibrium picks the\nblock size, that choice will dictate the level of competition for fees, the\nlevel of scarcity of an economically scarce resource.  Picking the block\nsize advantages some businesses over others, some business models over\nothers.  Software (and software devs) should not be the ones picking that\nlimit.\n\nChecks-and-balances are also important.  BIP 100 notably includes two steps\nat which user input is visibly and actively injected:   1) hard fork to\nenable, and 2) a second hard fork if the system is to scale beyond 32MB.\nThe network users (not miners) twice approve the system.  Further, one must\nremember all the basic miner incentives that do align with users, notably\nthat of maintaining the value of bitcoin tokens as their primary income\nstream.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nOn Sun, Jun 14, 2015 at 12:16 AM, Stephen \u003cstephencalebmorse at gmail.com\u003e\nwrote:\n\n\u003e While this idea is theoretically interesting because it involves many\n\u003e stakeholders, rather than just miners, I think in practice this would not\n\u003e work very well. Users don't want to worry about this kind of technicality,\n\u003e they just want to be able to make a transaction and have it be processed.\n\u003e\n\u003e In addition, while this gives stakeholders some weight with the fees they\n\u003e supply, these fees are marginal compared to the block size subsidy. If this\n\u003e proposal were actually implemented, I think miners would vote for whatever\n\u003e they think is best, and users would not contradict them with their votes to\n\u003e ensure a fast confirmation time. Users are incentivized to be in agreement\n\u003e with miners because the miners provide them with the confirmations they\n\u003e need, but fees do not provide a great incentive for miners to be in\n\u003e agreement with users, and likely won't for some time.\n\u003e\n\u003e Best,\n\u003e Stephen\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e \u003e On Jun 12, 2015, at 2:11 PM, Peter Todd \u003cpete at petertodd.org\u003e wrote:\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e Jeff Garzik recently proposed that the upper blocksize limit be removed\n\u003e \u003e entirely, with a \"soft\" limit being enforced via miner vote, recorded by\n\u003e \u003e hashing power.\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e This mechanism within the protocol for users to have any influence over\n\u003e \u003e the miner vote. We can add that back by providing a way for transactions\n\u003e \u003e themselves to set a flag determining whether or not they can be included\n\u003e \u003e in a block casting a specific vote.\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e We can simplify Garzik's vote to say that one of the nVersion bits\n\u003e \u003e either votes for the blocksize to be increased, or decreased, by some\n\u003e \u003e fixed ratio (e.g 2x or 1/2x) the next interval. Then we can use a\n\u003e \u003e nVersion bit in transactions themselves, also voting for an increase or\n\u003e \u003e decrease. Transactions may only be included in blocks with an\n\u003e \u003e indentical vote, thus providing miners with a monetary incentive via\n\u003e \u003e fees to vote according to user wishes.\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e Of course, to cast a \"don't care\" vote we can either define an\n\u003e \u003e additional bit, or sign the transaction with both versions. Equally we\n\u003e \u003e can even have different versions with different fees, broadcast via a\n\u003e \u003e mechanism such as replace-by-fee.\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e See also John Dillon's proposal for proof-of-stake blocksize voting:\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e https://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net/msg02323.html\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e --\n\u003e \u003e 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org\n\u003e \u003e 0000000000000000127ab1d576dc851f374424f1269c4700ccaba2c42d97e778\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e ------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\u003e \u003e _______________________________________________\n\u003e \u003e Bitcoin-development mailing list\n\u003e \u003e Bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net\n\u003e \u003e https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e ------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\u003e _______________________________________________\n\u003e Bitcoin-development mailing list\n\u003e Bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net\n\u003e https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development\n\u003e\n\n\n\n-- \nJeff Garzik\nBitcoin core developer and open source evangelist\nBitPay, Inc.      https://bitpay.com/\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20150614/a0c711a4/attachment.html\u003e"}