{"type":"rich","version":"1.0","author_name":"npub1xqcwcttsyk0a64d63crrwsxp88pa42np37rw87hrfn4uku78g2aqltcnns","author_url":"https://nostr.ae/npub1xqcwcttsyk0a64d63crrwsxp88pa42np37rw87hrfn4uku78g2aqltcnns","provider_name":"njump","provider_url":"https://nostr.ae","html":"📅 Original date posted:2021-05-21\n📝 Original message:@Erik\n\u003e  it also solves the \"nothing at stake\" problem\n\nA. the \"nothing at stake\" problem can be and has been solved by PoS\nconsensus mechanisms (unless you mean it more broadly than I'm taking it),\nand B. Proof of Burn should have just as much \"nothing at stake\" issues as\nPoS. Both consensus mechanisms depend on the current state of the chain to\ndetermine whether someone's stake or burn would allow the creation of a\nblock. But I am curious, how does proof of burn solve the \"nothing at\nstake\" problem in your view?\n\nOn Fri, May 21, 2021 at 10:58 AM Erik Aronesty \u003cerik at q32.com\u003e wrote:\n\n\u003e proof of burn has all the benefits of proof of stake (if there are any)\n\u003e\n\u003e but it also solves the \"nothing at stake\" problem\n\u003e\n\u003e the incentive in POB is that you're making a long-term investment in\n\u003e mining, and you want a stable protocol, quality network, etc.... to\n\u003e pay off your investment.\n\u003e\n\u003e On Thu, May 20, 2021 at 8:04 PM Billy Tetrud \u003cbilly.tetrud at gmail.com\u003e\n\u003e wrote:\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e I think there is a lot of misinformation and bias against Proof of\n\u003e Stake. Yes there have been lots of shady coins that use insecure PoS\n\u003e mechanisms. Yes there have been massive issues with distribution of PoS\n\u003e coins (of course there have also been massive issues with PoW coins as\n\u003e well). However, I want to remind everyone that there is a difference\n\u003e between \"proved to be impossible\" and \"have not achieved recognized success\n\u003e yet\". Most of the arguments levied against PoS are out of date or rely on\n\u003e unproven assumptions or extrapolation from the analysis of a particular PoS\n\u003e system. I certainly don't think we should experiment with bitcoin by\n\u003e switching to PoS, but from my research, it seems very likely that there is\n\u003e a proof of stake consensus protocol we could build that has substantially\n\u003e higher security (cost / capital required to execute an attack) while at the\n\u003e same time costing far less resources (which do translate to fees on the\n\u003e network) *without* compromising any of the critical security properties\n\u003e bitcoin relies on. I think the critical piece of this is the disagreements\n\u003e around hardcoded checkpoints, which is a critical piece solving attacks\n\u003e that could be levied on a PoS chain, and how that does (or doesn't) affect\n\u003e the security model.\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e @Eric Your proof of stake fallacy seems to be saying that PoS is worse\n\u003e when a 51% attack happens. While I agree, I think that line of thinking\n\u003e omits important facts:\n\u003e \u003e * The capital required to 51% attack a PoS chain can be made\n\u003e substantially greater than on a PoS chain.\n\u003e \u003e * The capital the attacker stands to lose can be substantially greater\n\u003e as well if the attack is successful.\n\u003e \u003e * The effectiveness of paying miners to raise the honest fraction of\n\u003e miners above 50% may be quite bad.\n\u003e \u003e * Allowing a 51% attack is already unacceptable. It should be considered\n\u003e whether what happens in the case of a 51% may not be significantly\n\u003e different. The currency would likely be critically damaged in a 51% attack\n\u003e regardless of consensus mechanism.\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e \u003e Proof-of-stake tends towards oligopolistic control\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e People repeat this often, but the facts support this. There is no\n\u003e centralization pressure in any proof of stake mechanism that I'm aware of.\n\u003e IE if you have 10 times as much coin that you use to mint blocks, you\n\u003e should expect to earn 10x as much minting revenue - not more than 10x. By\n\u003e contrast, proof of work does in fact have clear centralization pressure -\n\u003e this is not disputed. Our goal in relation to that is to ensure that the\n\u003e centralization pressure remains insignifiant. Proof of work also clearly\n\u003e has a lot more barriers to entry than any proof of stake system does. Both\n\u003e of these mean the tendency towards oligopolistic control is worse for PoW.\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e \u003e Energy usage, in-and-of-itself, is nothing to be ashamed of!!\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e I certainly agree. Bitcoin's energy usage at the moment is I think quite\n\u003e warranted. However, the question is: can we do substantially better. I\n\u003e think if we can, we probably should... eventually.\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e \u003e Proof of Stake is only resilient to ⅓ of the network demonstrating a\n\u003e Byzantine Fault, whilst Proof of Work is resilient up to the ½ threshold\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e I see no mention of this in the pos.pdf you linked to. I'm not aware of\n\u003e any proof that all PoS systems have a failure threshold of 1/3. I know that\n\u003e staking systems like Casper do in fact have that 1/3 requirement. However\n\u003e there are PoS designs that should exceed that up to nearly 50% as far as\n\u003e I'm aware. Proof of work is not in fact resilient up to the 1/2 threshold\n\u003e in the way you would think. IE, if 100% of miners are currently honest and\n\u003e have a collective 100 exahashes/s hashpower, an attacker does not need to\n\u003e obtain 100 exahashes/s, but actually only needs to accumulate 50\n\u003e exahashes/s. This is because as the attacker accumulates hashpower, it\n\u003e drives honest miners out of the market as the difficulty increases to\n\u003e beyond what is economically sustainable. Also, its been shown that the best\n\u003e proof of work can do is require an attacker to obtain 33% of the hashpower\n\u003e because of the selfish mining attack discussed in depth in this paper:\n\u003e https://arxiv.org/abs/1311.0243. Together, both of these things reduce\n\u003e PoW's security by a factor of about 83% (1 - 50%*33%).\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e  \u003e Proof of Stake requires other trade-offs which are incompatible with\n\u003e Bitcoin's objective (to be a trustless digital cash) — specifically the\n\u003e famous \"security vs. liveness\" guarantee\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e Do you have a good source that talks about why you think proof of stake\n\u003e cannot be used for a trustless digital cash?\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e \u003e You cannot gain tokens without someone choosing to give up those coins\n\u003e - a form of permission.\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e This is not a practical constraint. Just like in mining, some nodes may\n\u003e reject you, but there will likely be more that will accept you, some\n\u003e sellers may reject you, but most would accept your money as payment for\n\u003e bitcoins. I don't think requiring the \"permission\" of one of millions of\n\u003e people in the market can be reasonably considered a \"permissioned currency\".\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e \u003e 2. Proof of stake must have a trusted means of timestamping to\n\u003e regulate overproduction of blocks\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e Both PoW and PoS could mine/mint blocks twice as fast if everyone agreed\n\u003e to double their clock speeds. Both systems rely on an honest majority\n\u003e sticking to standard time.\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e On Wed, May 19, 2021 at 5:32 AM Michael Dubrovsky via bitcoin-dev \u003c\n\u003e bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e wrote:\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e Ah sorry, I didn't realize this was, in fact, a different thread! :)\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e On Wed, May 19, 2021 at 10:07 AM Michael Dubrovsky \u003cmike at powx.org\u003e\n\u003e wrote:\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e Folks, I suggest we keep the discussion to PoW, oPoW, and the BIP\n\u003e itself. PoS, VDFs, and so on are interesting but I guess there are other\n\u003e threads going on these topics already where they would be relevant.\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e Also, it's important to distinguish between oPoW and these other\n\u003e \"alternatives\" to Hashcash. oPoW is a true Proof of Work that doesn't alter\n\u003e the core game theory or security assumptions of Hashcash and actually\n\u003e contains SHA (can be SHA3, SHA256, etc hash is interchangeable).\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e Cheers,\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e Mike\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e On Tue, May 18, 2021 at 4:55 PM Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-dev \u003c\n\u003e bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e wrote:\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e 1. i never suggested vdf's to replace pow.\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e 2. my suggestion was specifically *in the context of* a working\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e proof-of-burn protocol\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e - vdfs used only for timing (not block height)\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e - blind-burned coins of a specific age used to replace proof of work\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e - the required \"work\" per block would simply be a competition to\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e acquire rewards, and so miners would have to burn coins, well in\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e advance, and hope that their burned coins got rewarded in some far\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e future\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e - the point of burned coins is to mimic, in every meaningful way, the\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e value gained from proof of work... without some of the security\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e drawbacks\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e - the miner risks losing all of his burned coins (like all miners risk\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e losing their work in each block)\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e - new burns can't be used\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e - old burns age out (like ASICs do)\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e - other requirements on burns might be needed to properly mirror the\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e properties of PoW and the incentives Bitcoin uses to mine honestly.\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e 3. i do believe it is *possible* that a \"burned coin + vdf system\"\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e might be more secure in the long run, and that if the entire space\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e agreed that such an endeavor was worthwhile, a test net could be spun\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e up, and a hard-fork could be initiated.\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e 4. i would never suggest such a thing unless i believed it was\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e possible that consensus was possible.  so no, this is not an \"alt\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e coin\"\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e On Tue, May 18, 2021 at 10:02 AM Zac Greenwood \u003czachgrw at gmail.com\u003e\n\u003e wrote:\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e Hi ZmnSCPxj,\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e Please note that I am not suggesting VDFs as a means to save\n\u003e energy, but solely as a means to make the time between blocks more constant.\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e Zac\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e On Tue, 18 May 2021 at 12:42, ZmnSCPxj \u003cZmnSCPxj at protonmail.com\u003e\n\u003e wrote:\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\u003e Good morning Zac,\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\u003e \u003e VDFs might enable more constant block times, for instance by\n\u003e having a two-step PoW:\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\u003e \u003e 1. Use a VDF that takes say 9 minutes to resolve (VDF being\n\u003e subject to difficulty adjustments similar to the as-is). As per the\n\u003e property of VDFs, miners are able show proof of work.\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\u003e \u003e 2. Use current PoW mechanism with lower difficulty so finding a\n\u003e block takes 1 minute on average, again subject to as-is difficulty\n\u003e adjustments.\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\u003e \u003e As a result, variation in block times will be greatly reduced.\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\u003e As I understand it, another weakness of VDFs is that they are not\n\u003e inherently progress-free (their sequential nature prevents that; they are\n\u003e inherently progress-requiring).\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\u003e Thus, a miner which focuses on improving the amount of energy that\n\u003e it can pump into the VDF circuitry (by overclocking and freezing the\n\u003e circuitry), could potentially get into a winner-takes-all situation,\n\u003e possibly leading to even *worse* competition and even *more* energy\n\u003e consumption.\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\u003e After all, if you can start mining 0.1s faster than the\n\u003e competition, that is a 0.1s advantage where *only you* can mine *in the\n\u003e entire world*.\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\u003e Regards,\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\u003e ZmnSCPxj\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e _______________________________________________\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e bitcoin-dev mailing list\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e --\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e Michael Dubrovsky\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e Founder; PoWx\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e www.PoWx.org\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e --\n\u003e \u003e\u003e Michael Dubrovsky\n\u003e \u003e\u003e Founder; PoWx\n\u003e \u003e\u003e www.PoWx.org\n\u003e \u003e\u003e _______________________________________________\n\u003e \u003e\u003e bitcoin-dev mailing list\n\u003e \u003e\u003e bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\n\u003e \u003e\u003e https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev\n\u003e\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20210521/0d41b5ee/attachment-0001.html\u003e"}