{"type":"rich","version":"1.0","author_name":"npub1g6vxlp4e0nyhs2dqxxcryztyf5f5hyuaq93nw4r87zcnv0sdsa0qqsl5wd","author_url":"https://nostr.ae/npub1g6vxlp4e0nyhs2dqxxcryztyf5f5hyuaq93nw4r87zcnv0sdsa0qqsl5wd","provider_name":"njump","provider_url":"https://nostr.ae","html":"📅 Original date posted:2015-06-19\n📝 Original message:On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 5:42 PM, Eric Lombrozo \u003celombrozo at gmail.com\u003e wrote:\n\n\u003e If we want a non-repudiation mechanism in the protocol, we should\n\u003e explicitly define one rather than relying on “prima facie” assumptions.\n\u003e Otherwise, I would recommend not relying on the existence of a signed\n\u003e transaction as proof of intent to pay…\n\u003e\n\nOutputs could be marked as \"locked\".  If you are performing a zero\nconfirmation spend, then the recipient could insist that you flag the\noutput for them as non-reducible.\n\nThis reduces privacy since it would be obvious which output was change.  If\nboth are locked, then the fee can't be increased.\n\nThis would be information that miners could ignore though.\n\nCreating the right incentives is hard though.  Blocks could be\n\"discouraged\" if they have a double spend that is known about for a while\nwhich reduces payment for a locked output.\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20150619/f5cec10d/attachment.html\u003e"}