{"type":"rich","version":"1.0","author_name":"npub1fx98zxt3lzspjs5f4msr0fxysx5euucm29ghysryju7vpc9j0jzqtcl2d8","author_url":"https://nostr.ae/npub1fx98zxt3lzspjs5f4msr0fxysx5euucm29ghysryju7vpc9j0jzqtcl2d8","provider_name":"njump","provider_url":"https://nostr.ae","html":"📅 Original date posted:2015-06-20\n📝 Original message:On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 5:37 PM, Eric Lombrozo \u003celombrozo at gmail.com\u003e wrote:\n\u003e The Bitcoin network was designed (or should be designed) with the requirement that it can withstand deliberate double-spend attacks that can come from anywhere at any time…\n\nI disagree with this premise. Please, don't take this as an argument\nfrom authority fallacy, but I will cite Satoshi to express what I\nthink the assumptions while using the system should be:\n\n\"As long as a majority of CPU power is controlled by nodes that are\nnot cooperating to attack the network, they'll generate the longest\nchain and outpace attackers.\"\n\nI can't say for sure what was meant by \"attacking the network\" in this\ncontext but I personally mean trying to rewrite valid and\nproof-of-work-timestamped history.\nUnconfirmed transactions are simply not part of history yet. Ordering\nunconfirmed transactions in a consensus compatible way without a\nuniversal clock is impossible, that's why we're using proof of work in\nthe first place.\n\nAlternative policies are NOT attacks on the network."}