{"type":"rich","version":"1.0","author_name":"npub1m230cem2yh3mtdzkg32qhj73uytgkyg5ylxsu083n3tpjnajxx4qqa2np2","author_url":"https://nostr.ae/npub1m230cem2yh3mtdzkg32qhj73uytgkyg5ylxsu083n3tpjnajxx4qqa2np2","provider_name":"njump","provider_url":"https://nostr.ae","html":"📅 Original date posted:2022-11-07\n📝 Original message:On November 3, 2022 5:06:52 PM AST, yancy via bitcoin-dev \u003cbitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e wrote:\n\u003e\n\u003eAJ/Antoine et al\n\u003e\n\u003e\u003e What should folks wanting to do coinjoins/dualfunding/dlcs/etc do to\n\u003e\u003e solve that problem if they have only opt-in RBF available?\n\u003e\n\u003eAssuming Alice is a well funded advisory, with enough resources to spam the network so that enough nodes see her malicious transaction first, how does full-rbf solve this vs. opt-in rbf?\n\nFirst of all, to make things clear, remember that the attacks were talking about are aimed at _preventing_ a transaction from getting mined. Alice wants to cheaply broadcast something with low fees that won't get mined soon (if ever), that prevents a protocol from making forward progress.\n\nWith full-rbf, who saw what transaction first doesn't matter: the higher fee paying transaction will always(*) replace the lower fee one. With opt-in RBF, spamming the network can beat out the alternative.\n\n*) So what's the catch? Well, due to limitations in today's mempool implementation, sometimes we can't fully evaluate which tx pays the higher fee. For example, if Alice spams the network with very _large_ numbers transactions spending that input, the current mempool code doesn't even try to figure out if a replacement is better.\n\nBut those limitations are likely to be fixable. And even right now, without fixing them, Alice still has to use a lot more money to pull off these attacks with full-rbf. So full-rbf definitely improves the situation even if it doesn't solve the problem completely."}