<oembed><type>rich</type><version>1.0</version><author_name>npub1nxlvf9mj3jzgue25n5d9y47s3h5hvg0ded9hwpejdxj9mtrs34vs97wjrv</author_name><author_url>https://nostr.ae/npub1nxlvf9mj3jzgue25n5d9y47s3h5hvg0ded9hwpejdxj9mtrs34vs97wjrv</author_url><provider_name>njump</provider_name><provider_url>https://nostr.ae</provider_url><html>📅 Original date posted:2012-11-27&#xA;📝 Original message:On Tuesday 27 November 2012 17:14:19 Mike Hearn wrote:&#xA;&#xA;&gt; That&#39;s pretty much what we have today - in future other schemes can be&#xA;&gt; proposed as extensions. Protocol buffers are easily extended, they&#xA;&gt; ignore unknown fields. Then you&#39;d wait and see what the invoice&#xA;&gt; request looked like and produce an invoice with the right security&#xA;&gt; bits.&#xA;&#xA;That&#39;s good; I&#39;ve not done anything with protocol buffers, so wasn&#39;t aware it &#xA;was that simple.&#xA;&#xA;&gt; &gt; In particular two additional identification types:&#xA;&gt; &gt;  - GnuPG (obviously)&#xA;&gt; &#xA;&gt; It&#39;s not obvious to me, incidentally. The web of trust has been&#xA;&gt; dead-on-arrival since it was first proposed, and for good reasons.&#xA;&gt; SSL/X.509, for better or worse, has significant usage.&#xA;&#xA;Sorry, I meant &#34;obviously&#34; in the sense that &#34;obviously that&#39;s the other one &#xA;that everyone will want&#34;.  The web-of-trust as a universal identity mechanism &#xA;is, I agree, not useful.  However, as a localised, smaller-scale identity &#xA;verification system it&#39;s used by every GnuPG user.  You become your own &#xA;certificate authority.  For example, I&#39;ve set up my whole family with GnuPG; &#xA;I&#39;ve set them up to trust me to authenticate (and I doubt any of them has ever &#xA;added anyone else).  Then I take on the responsibility of signing all my &#xA;family/friends keys and they don&#39;t need to worry about it.&#xA;&#xA;There&#39;s no reason that a small group of companies wouldn&#39;t do exactly the same &#xA;sort of thing.&#xA;&#xA;&gt; Your case of a small business is a perfect example of people who won&#39;t&#xA;&gt; be using GPG. If they don&#39;t want to buy an SSL cert, they can just as&#xA;&#xA;Bear in mind, I was using that example as an example of a hash protected in a &#xA;GPG envelope, not a GPG-signed invoice.  People who&#39;ve already got their GPG &#xA;system in place will appreciate being able to leverage it.&#xA;&#xA;&gt; well put a reference number in the memo field or a &#34;Hey Bob, here is&#xA;&gt; the bill we discussed&#34;. The payer does not get the multi-factor auth&#xA;&#xA;How can they put a hash of an invoice inside the invoice?  In my &#34;hash mode&#34; &#xA;invoices, it would be a random number (or possibly specifying the hash &#xA;algorithm) then the SignedInvoice would simply be the original invoice + hash.  &#xA;That hash would then be reported via some secure channel outside of bitcoin&#39;s &#xA;domain.&#xA;&#xA;&gt; protection so if their computer has a virus, they may be hosed. But&#xA;&gt; that&#39;s good incentive for sellers to get verified. Some CA authorities&#xA;&gt; do it for free these days.&#xA;&#xA;I don&#39;t understand what the relevance of multi-factor is to invoices?  The &#xA;payment is performed via normal bitcoin mechanisms isn&#39;t it -- multi-factor or &#xA;not?  This invoice system has one primary job: to ensure that the target of &#xA;the payment is who the payer thinks it is -- that&#39;s not affected by multi-&#xA;factor methods of protecting my wallet.&#xA;&#xA;&#xA;&#xA;Andy&#xA;&#xA;-- &#xA;Dr Andy Parkins&#xA;andyparkins at gmail.com</html></oembed>