<oembed><type>rich</type><version>1.0</version><author_name>npub17qxssk9sj2r7jswvh3y32e7vwz7mcckhz33gk9nurdmw0lhsfkgswupwet</author_name><author_url>https://nostr.ae/npub17qxssk9sj2r7jswvh3y32e7vwz7mcckhz33gk9nurdmw0lhsfkgswupwet</author_url><provider_name>njump</provider_name><provider_url>https://nostr.ae</provider_url><html>📅 Original date posted:2015-06-12&#xA;📝 Original message:Why should miners only be able to vote for &#34;double the limit&#34; or &#34;halve&#34; the limit? If you&#39;re going to use bits, I think you need to use two bits:&#xA;&#xA;&#x9;0 0 = no preference (&#34;wildcard&#34; vote)&#xA;&#x9;0 1 = vote for the limit to remain the same&#xA;&#x9;1 0 = vote for the limit to be halved&#xA;&#x9;1 1 = vote for the limit to be doubled&#xA;&#xA;User transactions would follow the same usage. In particular, a user vote of &#34;0 0&#34; (no preference) could be included in a block casting any vote, but a block voting &#34;0 0&#34; (no preference) could only contain transactions voting &#34;0 0&#34; as well.&#xA;&#xA;Incidentally, I love this idea, as it addresses a concern I immediately had with Jeff&#39;s proposal, which is that it hands control exclusively to the miners. And your proposal here fixes that shortcoming in a economically powerful way: miners lose out on fees if they don&#39;t represent the wishes of the users.&#xA;&#xA;&#xA;On Friday, 12 June 2015, at 2:11 pm, Peter Todd wrote:&#xA;&gt; Jeff Garzik recently proposed that the upper blocksize limit be removed&#xA;&gt; entirely, with a &#34;soft&#34; limit being enforced via miner vote, recorded by&#xA;&gt; hashing power.&#xA;&gt; &#xA;&gt; This mechanism within the protocol for users to have any influence over&#xA;&gt; the miner vote. We can add that back by providing a way for transactions&#xA;&gt; themselves to set a flag determining whether or not they can be included&#xA;&gt; in a block casting a specific vote.&#xA;&gt; &#xA;&gt; We can simplify Garzik&#39;s vote to say that one of the nVersion bits&#xA;&gt; either votes for the blocksize to be increased, or decreased, by some&#xA;&gt; fixed ratio (e.g 2x or 1/2x) the next interval. Then we can use a&#xA;&gt; nVersion bit in transactions themselves, also voting for an increase or&#xA;&gt; decrease. Transactions may only be included in blocks with an&#xA;&gt; indentical vote, thus providing miners with a monetary incentive via&#xA;&gt; fees to vote according to user wishes.&#xA;&gt; &#xA;&gt; Of course, to cast a &#34;don&#39;t care&#34; vote we can either define an&#xA;&gt; additional bit, or sign the transaction with both versions. Equally we&#xA;&gt; can even have different versions with different fees, broadcast via a&#xA;&gt; mechanism such as replace-by-fee.&#xA;&gt; &#xA;&gt; &#xA;&gt; See also John Dillon&#39;s proposal for proof-of-stake blocksize voting:&#xA;&gt; &#xA;&gt; https://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net/msg02323.html&#xA;&gt; &#xA;&gt; -- &#xA;&gt; &#39;peter&#39;[:-1]@petertodd.org&#xA;&gt; 0000000000000000127ab1d576dc851f374424f1269c4700ccaba2c42d97e778</html></oembed>