<oembed><type>rich</type><version>1.0</version><author_name>npub1zw7cc8z78v6s3grujfvcv3ckpvg6kr0w7nz9yzvwyglyg0qu5sjsqhkhpx</author_name><author_url>https://nostr.ae/npub1zw7cc8z78v6s3grujfvcv3ckpvg6kr0w7nz9yzvwyglyg0qu5sjsqhkhpx</author_url><provider_name>njump</provider_name><provider_url>https://nostr.ae</provider_url><html>📅 Original date posted:2020-10-13&#xA;📝 Original message:&#xA;Joost Jager &lt;joost.jager at gmail.com&gt; writes:&#xA;&gt; This hold fee could be: lock_time * (fee_base + fee_rate * htlc_value).&#xA;&gt; fee_base is in there to compensate for the usage of an htlc slot, which is&#xA;&gt; a scarce resource too.&#xA;&#xA;...&#xA;&gt; &#xA;&gt; In both cases the sender needs to trust its peer to not steal the payment&#xA;&gt; and/or artificially delay the forwarding to inflate the hold fee. I think&#xA;&gt; that is acceptable given that there is a trust relation between peers&#xA;&gt; already anyway.&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt; A crucial thing is that these hold fees don&#39;t need to be symmetric. A new&#xA;&gt; node for example that opens a channel to a well-known, established routing&#xA;&gt; node will be forced to pay a hold fee, but won&#39;t see any traffic coming in&#xA;&gt; anymore if it announces a hold fee itself. Nodes will need to build a&#xA;&gt; reputation before they&#39;re able to command hold fees. Similarly, routing&#xA;&gt; nodes that have a strong relation may decide to not charge hold fees to&#xA;&gt; each other at all.&#xA;&#xA;I can still establish channels to various low-reputation nodes, and then&#xA;use them to grief a high-reputation node.  Not only do I get to jam up&#xA;the high-reputation channels, as a bonus I get the low-reputation nodes&#xA;to pay for it!&#xA;&#xA;Operators of high reputation nodes can even make this profitable; doubly&#xA;so, since they eliminate the chance of any of those low-reputation nodes&#xA;every getting to be high reputation (and thus competing).&#xA;&#xA;AFAICT any scheme which penalizes the direct peer creates a bias against&#xA;forwarding unknown payments, thus is deanonymizing.&#xA;&#xA;&gt; I&#39;d also like to encourage everyone to prioritize this spam/jam issue and&#xA;&gt; dedicate more time to solving it. Obviously there is a lot more to do in&#xA;&gt; Lightning, but I am not sure if we can afford to wait for the real&#xA;&gt; adversaries to show up on this one.&#xA;&#xA;Agreed.  It&#39;s a classic &#34;it&#39;s not actually on fire *right now*&#34; problem,&#xA;so it does keep getting pushed back.&#xA;&#xA;Cheers,&#xA;Rusty.</html></oembed>