<oembed><type>rich</type><version>1.0</version><author_name>npub1pl6kcz00s7wgn6syh73dta0qm9sqpmtw4adv8rnm2w9fmynkw45sayj0hj</author_name><author_url>https://nostr.ae/npub1pl6kcz00s7wgn6syh73dta0qm9sqpmtw4adv8rnm2w9fmynkw45sayj0hj</author_url><provider_name>njump</provider_name><provider_url>https://nostr.ae</provider_url><html>📅 Original date posted:2015-12-29&#xA;📝 Original message:Ultimately, a self-interested miner will chose to build on the block that leaves the most transaction fees up for grabs. (This usually means the smallest block.) It&#39;s an interesting question whether the default behavior for Core should be the rational behavior (build on the &#34;smallest&#34; block in terms of fees) or some other supposedly altruistic behavior (most BTCDD). This also applies to the decision of the &#34;same time&#34; threshold -- a selfish miner will not care if the blocks arrived at about the same time or not.&#xA;&#xA;I currently do not have a strong opinion on what that behavior should be, although if the blocksize limit were increased substantially, I may prefer the selfish behavior because it ends up also being fail-safe (punishes selfish mining using large blocks or fee-stealing attempts).&#xA;&#xA;&#xA;On Dec 29, 2015, at 10:59 AM, Dave Scotese via bitcoin-dev &lt;bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org&gt; wrote:&#xA;&#xA;&gt; There have been no decent objections to altering the block-selection mechanism (when two block solutions appear at nearly the same time) as described at&#xA;&gt; &#xA;&gt; http://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/questions/39226&#xA;&gt; &#xA;&gt; Key components are:&#xA;&gt; Compute BitcoinDaysDestroyed using only transactions that have been in your mempool for some time as oBTCDD (&#34;old BTCDD&#34;).&#xA;&gt; Use &#34;nearly the same time&#34; to mean separated in time by your guess of the average duration of block propagation times.&#xA;&gt; When two block solutions come in at nearly the same time, build on the one that has the most oBTCDD, rather than the one that came in first.&#xA;&gt; The goal of this change is to reduce the profitability of withholding block solutions by severely reducing the chances that a block solved a while ago can orphan one solved recently.  &#34;Came in first&#34; seems more easily gamed than &#34;most oBTCDD&#34;.  As I wrote there, &#34;old coins is always a dwindling resource and global nodes willing to help cheat is probably a growing one.&#34;&#xA;&gt; &#xA;&gt; I will write a BIP if anyone agrees it&#39;s a good idea.&#xA;&gt; &#xA;&gt; &#xA;&gt; On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 12:26 PM, Ivan Brightly via bitcoin-dev &lt;bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org&gt; wrote:&#xA;&gt; On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 2:12 PM, Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev &lt;bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org&gt; wrote:&#xA;&gt; Far more concerning is network propagation effects between large and&#xA;&gt; small miners. For that class of issues, if you are in an environemnt&#xA;&gt; where selfish mining is possible - a fairly flat, easily DoS/sybil&#xA;&gt; attacked network topology - the profitability difference between small&#xA;&gt; and large miners even *without* attacks going on is a hugely worrying&#xA;&gt; problem. OTOH, if you&#39;re blocksize is small enough that propagation time&#xA;&gt; is negligable to profitability, then selfish mining attacks with &lt;30%&#xA;&gt; hashing power aren&#39;t much of a concern - they&#39;ll be naturally defeated&#xA;&gt; by anti-DoS/anti-sybil measures.&#xA;&gt; &#xA;&gt; Let&#39;s agree that one factor in mining profitability is bandwidth/network reliability/stability. Why focus on that vs electricity contracts or vertically integrated chip manufacturers? Surely, sufficient network bandwidth is a more broadly available commodity than &lt;$0.02/kwh electricity, for example. I&#39;m not sure that your stranded hydroelectric miner is any more desirable than thousands of dorm room miners with access to 10gbit university connections and free electricity.&#xA;&gt; &#xA;&gt; _______________________________________________&#xA;&gt; bitcoin-dev mailing list&#xA;&gt; bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org&#xA;&gt; https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev&#xA;&gt; &#xA;&gt; &#xA;&gt; &#xA;&gt; &#xA;&gt; --&#xA;&gt; I like to provide some work at no charge to prove my value. Do you need a techie?&#xA;&gt; I own Litmocracy and Meme Racing (in alpha).&#xA;&gt; I&#39;m the webmaster for The Voluntaryist which now accepts Bitcoin.&#xA;&gt; I also code for The Dollar Vigilante.&#xA;&gt; &#34;He ought to find it more profitable to play by the rules&#34; - Satoshi Nakamoto&#xA;&gt; _______________________________________________&#xA;&gt; bitcoin-dev mailing list&#xA;&gt; bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org&#xA;&gt; https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev&#xA;&#xA;-------------- next part --------------&#xA;An HTML attachment was scrubbed...&#xA;URL: &lt;http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20151229/a62c256a/attachment-0001.html&gt;&#xA;-------------- next part --------------&#xA;A non-text attachment was scrubbed...&#xA;Name: signature.asc&#xA;Type: application/pgp-signature&#xA;Size: 496 bytes&#xA;Desc: Message signed with OpenPGP using GPGMail&#xA;URL: &lt;http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20151229/a62c256a/attachment-0001.sig&gt;</html></oembed>