rich1.0npub1tjephawh7fdf6358jufuh5eyxwauzrjqa7qn50pglee4tayc2ntqcjtl6rhttps://nostr.ae/npub1tjephawh7fdf6358jufuh5eyxwauzrjqa7qn50pglee4tayc2ntqcjtl6rnjumphttps://nostr.ae📅 Original date posted:2011-12-18 🗒️ Summary of this message: Using DNS-based alias systems for Bitcoin payments is vulnerable to spoofing. One solution is to embed a Bitcoin address in the identification string itself. 📝 Original message:On Mon, Dec 19, 2011 at 12:58:37AM +0100, slush wrote: > Maybe I'm retarded, but where's the point in providing alliases containing > yet another hash in URL? Any DNS-based alias system is vulnerable to spoofing. If I can make people's DNS server believe that mining.cz points to my IP, I'll receive payments to you... If no trusted CA is used to authenticate the communication, there is no way to be sure the one you are asking how to pay, is the person you want to pay. Therefore, one solution is to put a bitcoin address in the identification string itself, and requiring SSL communication authenticated using the respective key. This makes the identification strings obviously less useful as aliases, but pure aliases in the sense of human-typable strings have imho limited usefulness anyway - in most cases these identification strings will be communicated through other electronic means anyway. Furthermore, the embedded bitcoin address could be hidden from the user: retrieved when first connecting, and stored together with the URI in an address book. Like ssh, it could warn the user if the key changes (which wil be ignored by most users anyway, but what do you do about that?) -- Pieter