<oembed><type>rich</type><version>1.0</version><author_name>npub10etkvm8l0jr0jsgdx02dxnhnu5g989dnca90guj5rklwkaplnh3sgjc727</author_name><author_url>https://nostr.ae/npub10etkvm8l0jr0jsgdx02dxnhnu5g989dnca90guj5rklwkaplnh3sgjc727</author_url><provider_name>njump</provider_name><provider_url>https://nostr.ae</provider_url><html>📅 Original date posted:2014-01-18&#xA;📝 Original message:&gt; On Fri, Jan 17, 2014 at 8:55 PM, Alan Reiner &lt;etotheipi at gmail.com&gt; wrote:&#xA;&gt;&gt; Isn&#39;t there a much faster asymmetric scheme that we can use?  I&#39;ve heard people talk about ed25519, though I&#39;m not sure it can be used for encryption.&#xA;&gt; &#xA;&gt; Doing ECDH with our curve is within a factor of ~2 of the fastest&#xA;&gt; encryption available at this security level, AFAIK.  And separate&#xA;&gt; encryption would ~double the amount of data vs using the ephemeral key&#xA;&gt; for derivation.&#xA;&gt; &#xA;&gt; Using another cryptosystem would mandate carry around additional code&#xA;&gt; for a fast implementation of that cryptosystem, which wouldn&#39;t be&#xA;&gt; fantastic.&#xA;&gt; &#xA;&gt; So I&#39;m not sure much can be improved there.&#xA;&#xA;In the case where payment is being sent only to Q1, and Q2 is for discovery only, perhaps we could use a 160-bit curve for d2/Q2 and e/P resulting in 20 byte vs 32 bytes in the OP_RETURN, and of course faster multiplication. &#xA;&#xA;80-bits of security I assume still greatly exceeds the actual level of privacy you get with the overall solution, and since Q2 is never protecting actual funds...&#xA;&#xA;But if it&#39;s a &#34;real weakening&#34; of the privacy then definitely not worth it, and even the added complexity of another curve seems possibly not worth it...</html></oembed>