rich1.0npub1azvhdrf9fu6n0tm7yez4j6zcxcedp2ct6nrcq3z74naqs7kgpk8s5t2krqhttps://nostr.ae/npub1azvhdrf9fu6n0tm7yez4j6zcxcedp2ct6nrcq3z74naqs7kgpk8s5t2krqnjumphttps://nostr.ae📅 Original date posted:2011-12-21 🗒️ Summary of this message: Supernodes may emerge to validate transactions for other nodes, keeping lists of trustworthy nodes and partitioning them into a hashspace. Trustworthiness could be incentivized. 📝 Original message:Is it just me or does it seem inevitable that at some point supernodes will emerge that other nodes trust to validate transactions for them? Supernodes needn't even store the entire block chain and transaction pool...it would be sufficient that they keep lists of IP addresses of other trustworthy nodes and partition them into a hashspace. Anonymous peers have no reputation to defend...but a trusted supernode would, which could provide just enough incentive for the supernode to do its best to ensure the nodes it vouches for are indeed legit. Of course, unless the supernode is validating the entire block chain and transaction pool itself, it could only assess the trustworthiness of other nodes by performing random sampling. Michael, I really like your ideas and the clarity you bring to the issue. Regarding the potential attack vector you mention, would it be possible to partition the hashspace to minimize the risk that an attacker can manage to disproportionately gain control over a part of the hashspace?