rich1.0npub1uyhgpz5nsfnvdlcqm3erjsdjasd9pdeaejeetwtkvumm6mp3ujlqxt9vwkhttps://nostr.ae/npub1uyhgpz5nsfnvdlcqm3erjsdjasd9pdeaejeetwtkvumm6mp3ujlqxt9vwknjumphttps://nostr.ae📅 Original date posted:2023-03-03 📝 Original message: > With a binary solution a single attacker can easily fill your quota of > low-confidence HTLCs and then all low-reputation nodes are blocked. But not > all of them are attackers, some of them just don't send you enough traffic > to get a high reputation for instance and you're going to block them too. > With a continuous solution you can differentiate between an active attacker > and someone who just sends to nodes with poor connectivity and only block > the first. > If it's very cheap to behave like a neighbour with poor connectivity, why wouldn't the attacker mimic this, and then block? Differentiating between a potential attacker and just a low-traffic neighbour is very difficult. I think that instead of "low/high reputation" a better way to think about it is "unknown/endorsed", and just consider which neighbour needs access to all resources and which one doesn't. The idea of different bins was brought up a few times and might help a bit, but I am not sure at all that it is worth the complication. For reporting c truthfully, if you report it too high you will be penalized > by having your reputation lowered, if you report it too low you will > penalize your HTLCs and still get the same reputation as if you had > reported it truthfully. > It might be that there is a strong motivation to underestimate than overestimate. That is – the punishment for underestimating by X is significantly smaller than for overestimating by X (or vice versa). The formula you choose can affect this significantly. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: <http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/attachments/20230303/4c8fa6ae/attachment.html>