<oembed><type>rich</type><version>1.0</version><author_name>npub1f2nvlx49er5c7sqa43src6ssyp6snd4qwvtkwm5avc2l84cs84esecrwet</author_name><author_url>https://nostr.ae/npub1f2nvlx49er5c7sqa43src6ssyp6snd4qwvtkwm5avc2l84cs84esecrwet</author_url><provider_name>njump</provider_name><provider_url>https://nostr.ae</provider_url><html>📅 Original date posted:2014-02-19&#xA;📝 Original message:On Wed, Feb 19, 2014 at 12:28 PM, Michael Gronager &lt;gronager at mac.com&gt; wrote:&#xA;&gt; Twisting your words a bit I read:&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt; * you want to support relay of transactions that can be changed on the fly, but you consider it wrong to modify them.&#xA;&gt; * #3 is already not forwarded, but you still find it relevant to support it.&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt; Rational use cases of #3 will be pretty hard to find given the fact that they can be changed on the fly. We are down to inclusion in blocks by miners for special purposes - or did I miss out something?&#xA;&#xA;You did. See the other sighash flags.&#xA;&#xA;&gt; I think that we could guarantee fewer incidents by making version 1 transactions unmalleable and then optionally introduce a version 3 that supported the malleability feature. That way most existing problematic implementations would be fixed and no doors were closed for people experimenting with other stuff - tx v 3 would probably then be called experimental transactions.&#xA;&#xA;In exchange you make the behavior basically impossible do deploy&#xA;without first blocking all ongoing transactions. This seems foolish.&#xA;All signers need to be updated to change their behavior to be&#xA;anti-malleability compatible, they can change their version at the&#xA;same time... and leave things actually working for the things which&#xA;can&#39;t be easily updated.</html></oembed>