<oembed><type>rich</type><version>1.0</version><author_name>npub1m230cem2yh3mtdzkg32qhj73uytgkyg5ylxsu083n3tpjnajxx4qqa2np2</author_name><author_url>https://nostr.ae/npub1m230cem2yh3mtdzkg32qhj73uytgkyg5ylxsu083n3tpjnajxx4qqa2np2</author_url><provider_name>njump</provider_name><provider_url>https://nostr.ae</provider_url><html>📅 Original date posted:2016-06-23&#xA;📝 Original message:On Tue, Jun 21, 2016 at 05:14:31PM -0700, Justin Newton wrote:&#xA;&gt; On Tue, Jun 21, 2016 at 3:13 PM, Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev &lt;&#xA;&gt; Hi Peter,&#xA;&gt;    Certainly AML/KYC compliance is one of the use cases that BIP 75 and our&#xA;&gt; certificates can support.  As a quick summary,&#xA;&gt; &#xA;&gt; There are individuals and entities that would like to buy, sell, and use&#xA;&gt; bitcoin, and other public blockchains, but that have compliance&#xA;&gt; requirements that they need to meet before they can do so.  Similarly,&#xA;&gt; companies and entrepreneurs in the space suffer under the potential threat&#xA;&gt; of fines, or in extreme cases, jail time, also for not meeting AML or&#xA;&gt; sanctions list compliance.  We wanted to build tools that allowed&#xA;&gt; entrepreneurs to breathe easy, while at the same time allow more people and&#xA;&gt; companies to enter the ecosystem.  We also believe that the solution we are&#xA;&gt; using has the characteristics that you want in such a solution, for example:&#xA;&gt; &#xA;&gt; 1&gt; Only the counterparties (and possibly their service providers in the&#xA;&gt; case of hosted services) in a transaction can see the identity data,&#xA;&gt; protecting user privacy.&#xA;&gt; &#xA;&gt; 2&gt; The counterparties themselves (and possibly their service providers in&#xA;&gt; the case of hosted services) decide whether identity information is&#xA;&gt; required for any given transaction.&#xA;&gt; &#xA;&gt; 3&gt; No trace is left on the blockchain or anywhere else (other than with the&#xA;&gt; counterparties) that identity information was even exchanged, protecting&#xA;&gt; fungibility&#xA;&gt; &#xA;&gt; 4&gt; The solution is based on open source and open standards, allowing open&#xA;&gt; permissionless innovation, versus parties building closed networks based on&#xA;&gt; closed standards.  The very fact that this solution went through the BIP&#xA;&gt; process and was adapted based on feedback is an example of how this is&#xA;&gt; better for users than the inevitable closed solution that would arise if&#xA;&gt; the open source, community vetted version didn’t already exist.&#xA;&gt; &#xA;&gt; I don’t know if you are opposed to organizations that have AML requirements&#xA;&gt; from using the bitcoin blockchain, but if you aren’t, why wouldn’t you&#xA;&gt; prefer an open source, open standards based solution to exclusionary,&#xA;&gt; proprietary ones?&#xA;&#xA;In some (most?) countries, it is illegal to offer telecoms services without&#xA;wiretap facilities. Does that mean Tor builds into its software &#34;open source&#34;&#xA;&#34;open standards&#34; wiretapping functionality? No. And interestingly, people&#xA;trying to add support for that stuff is actually a thing that keeps happening&#xA;in the Tor community...&#xA;&#xA;In any case, I&#39;d strongly argue that we remove BIP75 from the bips repository,&#xA;and boycott wallets that implement it. It&#39;s bad strategy for Bitcoin developers&#xA;to willingly participate in AML/KYC, just the same way as it&#39;s bad for Tor to&#xA;add wiretapping functionality, and W3C to support DRM tech. The minor tactical&#xA;wins you&#39;ll get our of this aren&#39;t worth it.&#xA;&#xA;-- &#xA;https://petertodd.org &#39;peter&#39;[:-1]@petertodd.org&#xA;-------------- next part --------------&#xA;A non-text attachment was scrubbed...&#xA;Name: signature.asc&#xA;Type: application/pgp-signature&#xA;Size: 455 bytes&#xA;Desc: Digital signature&#xA;URL: &lt;http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20160623/594d6918/attachment.sig&gt;</html></oembed>