rich1.0npub1kf0ppcjaguxekg24yx6smgxlu73qn0k8lm0t2wrqc0scpl7u3sgsmf3f58https://nostr.ae/npub1kf0ppcjaguxekg24yx6smgxlu73qn0k8lm0t2wrqc0scpl7u3sgsmf3f58njumphttps://nostr.ae📅 Original date posted:2015-08-21 📝 Original message:I don't see any link to data backing up "Bloom filter usage has declined significantly" Is there actual data showing this feature's use is declining or non-existent? On Fri, Aug 21, 2015 at 1:55 AM, Peter Todd <pete at petertodd.org> wrote: > On Fri, Aug 21, 2015 at 01:48:23AM -0400, Jeff Garzik via bitcoin-dev > wrote: > > If this is widely deployed + enabled, what is the impact to current > wallets > > in use? > > See my comment on the recently-opened issue, reproduced below. In short, > not all that much, especially if we adopt my suggestion of having the > Core implementation accept and respond to bloom filter requests from > non-upgraded clients regardless of whether or not NODE_BLOOM was set > until some fixed upgrade deadline in the future. > > > Note that since the last time NODE_BLOOM was proposed, the landcape for > (lite-)SPV clients has changed significantly in a few key ways: > > 1) @mikehearn's [Cartographer](https://github.com/mikehearn/httpseed) > seed protocol has been created and deployed in production to allow > (lite-)SPV clients to find nodes supporting arbitrary service bits, > notable NODE_GETUTXOs. > > 2) Bloom filter usage has declined significantly, as lite-SPV clients > are moving towards using centralized, trusted, servers run by the > wallet > authors. For instance > [Mycelium](https://github.com/mycelium-com/wallet), > [GreenBits](https://github.com/greenaddress/GreenBits), > [AirBitz]( > https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/3etohn/whats_wrong_with_breadwallet/ctirou5 > ), > and [Electrum](https://electrum.org/#home) all fall in this category. > > 3) Bloom filters [have been found](http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/763) to > have severe privacy issues, offering essentially no privacy at all. > Under many threat models a small number of trusted servers pose less > privacy security risk than connecting to random, sybil-attackable, > peers > using unencrypted connections and giving those peers very accurate > wallet contents information. > > 4) Finally, Bloom filters still have [unsolved DoS attack > issues]( > https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/3hjak7/the_hard_work_of_core_devs_not_xt_makes_bitcoin/cu9xntf?context=3 > ), > that will get significantly worse under upcoming blocksize increase > proposals. > > Re: service bit identifier, I'd just pick 1<<3 > > -https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/6578#issuecomment-133226943 > > -- > 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org > 00000000000000000402fe6fb9ad613c93e12bddfc6ec02a2bd92f002050594d > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: <http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20150821/a7e8d410/attachment.html>