<oembed><type>rich</type><version>1.0</version><author_name>npub1fx98zxt3lzspjs5f4msr0fxysx5euucm29ghysryju7vpc9j0jzqtcl2d8</author_name><author_url>https://nostr.ae/npub1fx98zxt3lzspjs5f4msr0fxysx5euucm29ghysryju7vpc9j0jzqtcl2d8</author_url><provider_name>njump</provider_name><provider_url>https://nostr.ae</provider_url><html>📅 Original date posted:2021-02-22&#xA;📝 Original message:Just to clarify, I&#39;m not saying bitcoin core should maintain the&#xA;&#34;oppose proposal&#34; part of the software. presumably people opposing the&#xA;change don&#39;t want much of the recent software changes anyway.&#xA;But perhaps it wouldn&#39;t be so bad, to oppose other proposals, perhaps.&#xA;I don&#39;t expect anyone to want this, but if people want it I offer&#xA;myself to code it,&#xA;I mean, just imagine that a day after publishing a bitcoin core&#xA;release with activation software for taproot some one, let&#39;s say in&#xA;New York reach an Agreement to &#34;just use the same activation&#xA;mechanism, but for our 32 mb hardfork, it&#39;s about time, now computers&#xA;are 64 bits anyway&#34;. How convenient would it be to just cancel that&#xA;with 2 lines in bitcoin core?&#xA;Not that I think it will be necessary, but perhaps we want it just in case.&#xA;&#xA;On Mon, Feb 22, 2021 at 5:31 PM Jorge Timón &lt;jtimon at jtimon.cc&gt; wrote:&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt; Sorry, I haven&#39;t read everything. I just want to say what I think is&#xA;&gt; the best option and why.&#xA;&gt; Let&#39;s say something like 2 years in which miners can signal activation&#xA;&gt; after which, the MUST signal it for their blocks to be valid (I think&#xA;&gt; this is LOT=true, but I don&#39;t remember what LOT stands for).&#xA;&gt; Some may argue than it&#39;s easier to move from LOT=false to LOT=true&#xA;&gt; than viceversa (I think I&#39;m getting this right), but either way&#xA;&gt; different clients could interpret things more differently more easily&#xA;&gt; and, you know, that&#39;s really bad.&#xA;&gt; If anyone is against the consensus change itself, what they should do&#xA;&gt; is run a client in which the must is turned into a MUST NOT. Whenever&#xA;&gt; miners signal activation, blocks aren&#39;t valid so that it doesn&#39;t&#xA;&gt; happen.&#xA;&gt; That way both sides can be cleanly separated and both communities&#xA;&gt; (assuming there&#39;s a community of users opposing the change) can stick&#xA;&gt; together with their own in the same chain. That is, having only 2&#xA;&gt; chains in total if there are users opposing the change or only one if&#xA;&gt; not, but never 2 chains for people who want the change or 2 chains for&#xA;&gt; pople who don&#39;t want it.&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt; Just my two sats, please nobody ask me &#34;why would anyone oppose&#xA;&gt; taproot?&#34; or anything similar. Because I&#39;m trying to generalize here,&#xA;&gt; if we&#39;re talking about activation, I think the specifics of the change&#xA;&gt; are kind of irrelevant.&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt; Separately: thanks to everyone who worked on taproot.&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt; On Mon, Feb 22, 2021 at 3:00 PM Matt Corallo via bitcoin-dev&#xA;&gt; &lt;bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org&gt; wrote:&#xA;&gt; &gt;&#xA;&gt; &gt;&#xA;&gt; &gt;&#xA;&gt; &gt; On Feb 22, 2021, at 05:16, Anthony Towns &lt;aj at erisian.com.au&gt; wrote:&#xA;&gt; &gt;&#xA;&gt; &gt; ﻿If a lockinontimeout=true node is requesting compact blocks from a&#xA;&gt; &gt; lockinontimeout=false node during a chainsplit in the MUST_SIGNAL phase,&#xA;&gt; &gt; I think that could result in a ban.&#xA;&gt; &gt;&#xA;&gt; &gt; More importantly, nodes on both sides of the fork need to find each other.&#xA;&gt; &gt;&#xA;&gt; &gt;&#xA;&gt; &gt; (If there was going to be an ongoing fork there&#39;d be bigger things to&#xA;&gt; &gt; worry about...)&#xA;&gt; &gt;&#xA;&gt; &gt;&#xA;&gt; &gt; I think it should be clear that a UASF-style command line option to allow consensus rule changes in the node in the short term, immediately before a fork carries some risk of a fork, even if I agree it may not persist over months. We can’t simply ignore that.&#xA;&gt; &gt;&#xA;&gt; &gt; I think the important specific case of this is something like &#34;if a chain&#xA;&gt; &gt; where taproot is impossible to activate is temporarily the most work,&#xA;&gt; &gt; miners with lockinontimeout=true need to be well connected so they don&#39;t&#xA;&gt; &gt; end up competing with each other while they&#39;re catching back up&#34;.&#xA;&gt; &gt;&#xA;&gt; &gt;&#xA;&gt; &gt; Between this and your above point, I think we probably agree - there is material  technical complexity hiding behind a “change the consensus rules“ option. Given it’s not a critical feature by any means, putting resources into fixing these issues probably isn’t worth it.&#xA;&gt; &gt;&#xA;&gt; &gt; Matt&#xA;&gt; &gt; _______________________________________________&#xA;&gt; &gt; bitcoin-dev mailing list&#xA;&gt; &gt; bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org&#xA;&gt; &gt; https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev</html></oembed>