<oembed><type>rich</type><version>1.0</version><author_name>npub1sa86gng3pvs3jgyt5majwcrhn8ck5qxgy9pjqxkh79u638cd7dys28y304</author_name><author_url>https://nostr.ae/npub1sa86gng3pvs3jgyt5majwcrhn8ck5qxgy9pjqxkh79u638cd7dys28y304</author_url><provider_name>njump</provider_name><provider_url>https://nostr.ae</provider_url><html>📅 Original date posted:2015-08-13&#xA;📝 Original message:&gt; On Aug 13, 2015, at 2:52 AM, Ashley Holman via bitcoin-dev &lt;bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org&gt; wrote:&#xA;&gt; &#xA;&gt; A concern I have is about security (hash rate) as a function of block size.&#xA;&gt; &#xA;&gt; I am assuming that hash rate is correlated with revenue from mining.&#xA;&gt; &#xA;&gt; Total revenue from fees as a function of block size should be a curve.  On one extreme of the curve, if blocks are too big, fee revenue tends towards 0 as there is no competition for block space.&#xA;&#xA;This isn’t necessarily true. Every miner has its own mining policy. If they choose to delay including transactions proportional to their fee + first seen, then you create a time based fee market. Want quick confirmation? Pay a high fee. Don’t care that much? Pay a low fee (and anywhere in between). This market would work just fine even if block capacity was unbounded.&#xA;&#xA;jp&#xA;-------------- next part --------------&#xA;A non-text attachment was scrubbed...&#xA;Name: signature.asc&#xA;Type: application/pgp-signature&#xA;Size: 842 bytes&#xA;Desc: Message signed with OpenPGP using GPGMail&#xA;URL: &lt;http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20150813/9b9afe12/attachment.sig&gt;</html></oembed>