<oembed><type>rich</type><version>1.0</version><author_name>npub1e46n428mcyfwznl7nlsf6d3s7rhlwm9x3cmkuqzt3emmdpadmkaqqjxmcu</author_name><author_url>https://nostr.ae/npub1e46n428mcyfwznl7nlsf6d3s7rhlwm9x3cmkuqzt3emmdpadmkaqqjxmcu</author_url><provider_name>njump</provider_name><provider_url>https://nostr.ae</provider_url><html>📅 Original date posted:2015-10-14&#xA;📝 Original message:That conversation missed a second issue. Namely that there is no way to punish people if there is a double spend in a micro block that happens in key block which reorg&#39;d away the first transaction. eg one miner mines a transaction in a micro block, another miner (either by not having seen the first yet, or being malicious - potentially the same miner) mines a key block which reorgs away the first micro block and then, in their first micro block, mines a double spend. This can happen at any time, so you end up having to fall back to regular full blocks for confirmation times :(.&#xA;&#xA;Also, Greg Slepak brought up a good point on twitter at https://twitter.com/taoeffect/status/654358023138209792. Noting that this model means users could no longer pick transactions in a mining pool which was set up in such a way (it could be tweaked to do so with separate rewards and pubkeys, but now the user can commit fraud at a much lower cost - their own pool reward, not the block&#39;s total reward).&#xA;&#xA;On October 14, 2015 11:28:51 AM PDT, Ittay via bitcoin-dev &lt;bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org&gt; wrote:&#xA;&gt;On Wed, Oct 14, 2015 at 2:12 PM, Bryan Bishop &lt;kanzure at gmail.com&gt;&#xA;&gt;wrote:&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt;&gt; On Wed, Oct 14, 2015 at 1:02 PM, Emin Gün Sirer&#xA;&gt;&gt; &lt;bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org&gt; wrote:&#xA;&gt;&gt; &gt; while the whitepaper has all the nitty gritty details:&#xA;&gt;&gt; &gt;      http://arxiv.org/abs/1510.02037&#xA;&gt;&gt;&#xA;&gt;&gt; Taking reward compensation back by fraud proofs is not enough to fix&#xA;&gt;&gt; the problems associated with double spending (such as, everyone has&#xA;&gt;to&#xA;&gt;&gt; wait for the &#34;real&#34; confirmations instead of the &#34;possibly&#xA;&gt;&gt; double-spend&#34; confirmations). Some of this was discussed in -wizards&#xA;&gt;&gt; recently:&#xA;&gt;&gt; http://gnusha.org/bitcoin-wizards/2015-09-19.log&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt;Fraud proof removes all the attacker&#39;s revenue. It&#39;s like the attacker&#xA;&gt;sacrifices an entire block for double spending in the current system. I&#xA;&gt;think Luke-Jr got it right at that discussion.&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt;Best,&#xA;&gt;Ittay&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt;------------------------------------------------------------------------&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt;_______________________________________________&#xA;&gt;bitcoin-dev mailing list&#xA;&gt;bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org&#xA;&gt;https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev&#xA;-------------- next part --------------&#xA;An HTML attachment was scrubbed...&#xA;URL: &lt;http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20151014/84d65583/attachment-0001.html&gt;</html></oembed>