rich1.0npub1g5zswf6y48f7fy90jf3tlcuwdmjn8znhzaa4vkmtxaeskca8hpss23ms3lhttps://nostr.ae/npub1g5zswf6y48f7fy90jf3tlcuwdmjn8znhzaa4vkmtxaeskca8hpss23ms3lnjumphttps://nostr.ae📅 Original date posted:2022-07-09 📝 Original message:Good morning e, and list, > Yet you posted several links which made that specific correlation, to which I was responding. > > Math cannot prove how much coin is “lost”, and even if it was provable that the amount of coin lost converges to the amount produced, it is of no consequence - for the reasons I’ve already pointed out. The amount of market production has no impact on market price, just as it does not with any other good. > > The reason to object to perpetual issuance is the impact on censorship resistance, not on price. To clarify about censorship resistance and perpetual issuance ("tail emission"): * Suppose I have two blockchains, one with a constant block subsidy, and one which *had* a block subsidy but the block subsidy has become negligible or zero. * Now consider a censoring miner. * If the miner rejects particular transactions (i.e. "censors") the miner loses out on the fees of those transactions. * Presumably, the miner does this because it gains other benefits from the censorship, economically equal or better to the earnings lost. * If the blockchain had a block subsidy, then the loss the miner incurs is small relative to the total earnings of each block. * If the blockchain had 0 block subsidy, then the loss the miner incurs is large relative to the total earnings of each block. * Thus, in the latter situation, the external benefit the miner gains from the censorship has to be proportionately larger than in the first situation. Basically, the block subsidy is a market distortion: the block subsidy erodes the value of held coins to pay for the security of coins being moved. But the block subsidy is still issued whether or not coins being moved are censored or not censored. Thus, there is no incentive, considering *only* the block subsidy, to not censor coin movements. Only per-transaction fees have an incentive to not censor coin movements. Thus, we should instead prepare for a future where the block subsidy *must* be removed, possibly before the existing schedule removes it, in case a majority coalition of miner ever decides to censor particular transactions without community consensus. Fortunately forcing the block subsidy to 0 is a softfork and thus easier to deploy. Regards, ZmnSCPxj