<oembed><type>rich</type><version>1.0</version><author_name>npub17ty4mumkv43w8wtt0xsz2jypck0gvw0j8xrcg6tpea25z2nh7meqf4qgyd</author_name><author_url>https://nostr.ae/npub17ty4mumkv43w8wtt0xsz2jypck0gvw0j8xrcg6tpea25z2nh7meqf4qgyd</author_url><provider_name>njump</provider_name><provider_url>https://nostr.ae</provider_url><html>📅 Original date posted:2012-11-27&#xA;📝 Original message:Luke-Jr - common subset of what operating systems ship is fine for me&#xA;as long as people do due diligence around mobile OS&#39; here. It seems&#xA;easier to me to just grab a list from a popular browser, on the&#xA;grounds that SSL is mostly used by them so nobody is going to buy an&#xA;SSL cert rejected by IE/Firefox/Chrome/etc. But intersecting OS lists&#xA;is effectively the same.&#xA;&#xA;For my own clients I&#39;d just ship my own copy of the canonical CA certs&#xA;regardless, because integrating with each operating systems&#xA;proprietary crypto APIs is a lot of work vs just loading a pem file&#xA;into OpenSSL. If there are a lot of people who want to use the OS cert&#xA;management UIs then I guess that can be a point wallet clients compete&#xA;on.&#xA;&#xA;&gt; Removing that and adding a opaque string called domain name, or&#xA;&gt; identityName would be sufficient to move the conversation forward&#xA;&gt; without the x.509 baggage.&#xA;&#xA;But it would result in implementations that do not meet the requirements.&#xA;&#xA;Yes, X.509 has problems. It&#39;s in the proposal because we can get the&#xA;effect we want (verifiable domain names in the UI) in about 50 lines&#xA;of code, today, with the id-verified keys people actually have already&#xA;bought.&#xA;&#xA;As Gavin says, we can add optional fields later to extend the protocol&#xA;in a backwards compatible way.</html></oembed>