rich1.0npub1vjzmc45k8dgujppapp2ue20h3l9apnsntgv4c0ukncvv549q64gsz4x8ddhttps://nostr.ae/npub1vjzmc45k8dgujppapp2ue20h3l9apnsntgv4c0ukncvv549q64gsz4x8ddnjumphttps://nostr.ae📅 Original date posted:2022-06-21 📝 Original message:HI alicexbt, > Lets consider there are 2 users with name Bob (normal LN user) and Carol (attacker running LN node) which I will use in this email for examples. In this case Bob and Carol can manage security of their OS and it is not affected by others using vulnerable systems or OS. Yes, I believe my argument was the set of components making the security of your LN node is far beyond Bitcoin softwares. Of course, you might review by yourself the millions lines of code entering in the trusted computing base (OS, bootloader, BIOS, device firmwares, essential utilities, ...) on which your cryptocurrency software stack lays out, and as such exercise an extended span of control on your personal computation. Though, while I hope we'll have more LN node operators doing so, I'm not sure it's realistic to expect it will be the behavior standard among them.. > The odds are low as you said, this can be managed by Bob and Carol because they can use a better ISP. Others using ISP with some issues may not affect their LN usage. Sure, though as I would like to underscore being dependent on a Bitcoin node policy and being dependent on a ISP internet traffic routing policy could be analyzed as logically equivalent, all things are equal. That said, if your personal risk aversion is too high for the Lightning security model, once it's well-understood there is a strong reliance on a censorship-resistant tx-relay network back to economically-rational miners, you're free to not use it and satisfy yourself with the Bitcoin base layer. > Bob might use full-rbf as its suggested by LN developers for secure LN usage and better for miners. Carol could use a different RBF policy for some nodes and mining. In this case Bob may get affected at some point because of Carol's choice to use a different RBF policy which was not true above. Indeed, your secure LN usage is going to be dependent of the number of p2p network nodes running an economically-rational policy like full-rbf. That said, I think it's reasonable to assume that the players of the Bitcoin game are economically-rational, and as such incentived to pick up a policy such as full-rbf. I know the term "economically-rational" is poorly defined here, and I think it could be interesting for any academic with an economic background to study the incentives of Bitcoin actors. > Allowing users to create different mempool policies is great. My thought process is to code for happy path, where X policy is expected for replacement and edge cases where Y policy or no policy would be used. Users can try out different policies and even act as attackers. This is also true for other things in mempool, 'spkreuse=conflict' prevents address reuse in the mempool when using knots. If I assume that address reuse is always relayed, this could become a problem if some users and miners adopt this setting in their mempool. Agree, I'm all in for people to experiment with mempool policies. Though at the end it's a software engineering resource question. If users are interested in more features, they're always free to implement themselves. Really, the binary distinction developers-vs-users doesn't make sense and if we would like Bitcoin to be successful in the long-term, we should promote high degree of software literacy among bitcoiners. > This makes sense and I would be interested to follow two things once full-rbf is available in a bitcoin core release: 1. Percentage of transaction getting replaced 2. Miners profit (Fee for replaced Tx - Fee for original Tx) Yes, I would be interested too to have those metrics once full-rbf is available in a bitcoin core release. I think that's something every full-rbf curious node operator could observe on its own with a few more loggers, at least for the first metric. > Can you explain how p2p coinjoin is affected with mempool DoS vector with some examples? What is considered a p2p coinjoin? Joinmarket or [Stonewall][1]? I don't remember the Joinmarket code right now and I don't know the ins and outs of Samourai coinjoin as I'm not sure the code is open source. Though let's say for a p2p coinjoin as one you can build once you have implemented LN's interactive construction protocol [0]. [0] https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/851 Here the DoS attack situation : - Alice, Bob and Caroll would like to coinjoin 3 inputs to 3 outputs - Each of the input is singly controlled by one party, e.g Alice owns input A, Bob owns input B, ... - Alice, Bob and Caroll exchanges a PSBT to build a multi-party funded transaction (the coinjoin_tx) - Alice is elected as the multi-party transaction broadcaster once the signatures have been exchanged - The block feerate is around 10sat/vb - One of the transaction input signals opt-in RBF, the transaction is attached a compelling feerate 10sat/vb - Caroll broadcasts a double-spend of her own input C, the double-spend is attached with a low-fee (1sat/vb) and it does _not_ signal opt-in RBF - Alice broadcasts the multi-party transaction, it is rejected by the network mempools because Alice double-spend is already present - Two alternatives are offered to the coinjoin participants : Alternative A) - They estimate the multi-party feerate as not high enough - They fee-bump at 20sat/vb - Caroll double-spend one of the input of her malicious double-spend to eject it from the network mempools - The multi-party transaction is confirmed at a block feerare far above what was necessary - Alice, Bob, Caroll have loss fee-bumping value without compensation - Note, even if Caroll is attacker and assuming the fee-bumping burden is fairly spread among participants, the economic loss inflicted is asymmetric Alternative B) - They wait until some time-out - They double-spend their own inputs, Alice double-spend utxo A, Bob double-spend utxo B - They wasted the timevalue of their inputs for the time-out delay - Note, even if Caroll is attacker and loss some timevalue too, the economic loss inflicted is asymmetric Let me know if you see any error or wrong in this DoS scenario exposure. I believe it's fairly simple to execute for a medium-skilled attacker. Antoine Le ven. 17 juin 2022 à 00:54, alicexbt <alicexbt at protonmail.com> a écrit : > Hi Antoine, > > > One could list the operating system on which is running your Lightning > process or the compiler toolchain turning out your Lightning source code > in a binary artifact. Some weird kernel's memory mapping change could allow > access to your channel funding keys, _without_ breaking the Bitcoin > consensus rules [0]. > > > Lets consider there are 2 users with name Bob (normal LN user) and Carol > (attacker running LN node) which I will use in this email for examples. In > this case Bob and Carol can manage security of their OS and it is not > affected by others using vulnerable systems or OS. > > Moreover, your Lightning node is also relying on the existence of a > global Internet allowing your HTLC transaction to flow from your physical > host to the crowd of transactions confirming in the blockchain. Due to > this "protocol assumption" your channel balance would be vulnerable to > any change in your ISP routing policy, e.g refusing to accept your IPV4 > traffic by a sudden desiderata to impose an IPV6 supremacy. Still > _without_ breaking the Bitcoin consensus rules. Of course, the odds of your > ISP operator adopting this behavior are really low, mostly because your > operator has to bind to social and economic constraints to stay in > business. > > > The odds are low as you said, this can be managed by Bob and Carol because > they can use a better ISP. Others using ISP with some issues may not affect > their LN usage. > > And I believe this imperative to stay in business is certainly not absent > in the incentives of the Bitcoin node operators. You're free to run any > policy on your node, especially one hardening the safety of your operations > beyond the default one. However, if you start to a transaction-relay > non-compatible with miner incentives, you won't have an efficient view of > the blockspace demand, and from then won't be able to offer compelling > feerates to execute your business transactions to satisfy your client > needs. Or you won't consolidate your wallet UTXOs at times of low-demand. > Indeed, a sane visibility of the mempools might not be critical now for your > Bitcoin operations, but this is not likely to become true with miner's > coinbase reward lowering with time and the system security relying on a > fruitful fee market. > > > Bob might use full-rbf as its suggested by LN developers for secure LN > usage and better for miners. Carol could use a different RBF policy for > some nodes and mining. In this case Bob may get affected at some point > because of Carol's choice to use a different RBF policy which was not true > above. > > > So assuming there is a significant number of economically rational > entities running p2p nodes, I think it's a reasonable assumption for > Lightning developers that a policy maximizing miner's income and economic > nodes operations will be widely run on the p2p network, and therefore lay > its security model on that. When there is a gap between the economically > optimal policy (full-rbf) and the effectively deployed one (optin), and > this gap constitutes a flaw for exploitation, I believe it's better to > fix it. > > > Agree with the assumption there is nothing wrong in experimenting with a > new RBF policy (non-default) if that helps some users and projects. > > If you have a different mode of thinking w.r.t how we should design > protocol in a trust-minimized, open, adversarial environment such as > Bitcoin, I'm curious to listen to it. > > > Allowing users to create different mempool policies is great. My thought > process is to code for happy path, where X policy is expected for > replacement and edge cases where Y policy or no policy would be used. Users > can try out different policies and even act as attackers. This is also true > for other things in mempool, 'spkreuse=conflict' prevents address reuse in > the mempool when using knots. If I assume that address reuse is always > relayed, this could become a problem if some users and miners adopt this > setting in their mempool. > > Of course not. If you deliver any critical software, you should attach a > solid manual explaining all the corner cases and rough edges. Even better > would be to enshrine the manual directly in your software API to minimize > the footgunish behaviors. E.g, with any ECC library, forbidding to reuse > nonces. If your user still ignores or misread the manual and provides an > insecure input, there is not that much you can do. > > > Agree with the documentation as it helps users. > > Given there are like 17000 public LN nodes, if half of them adopt full-rbf > it should give already a good number of full-rbf transaction-relay routes > across the p2p network graph. When we're there, we can measure and think > more about how to tune the full-rbf sub-topology. > > > Sounds good. > > Because it's breaking the reliability and security of their use-cases. > Use-cases which didn't exist a few years ago. The mempool DoS vector is > described here [4]. To the best of my understanding, it might affect a > bunch of use-cases, such as dual-funded channels, on-chain DLCs, p2p > coinjoins, batched submarine swaps out. With the attack described, the > honest set of users might not have visibility of the network mempools > that there is a malicious, low-cost, opt-out double-spend preventing the > propagation of their multi-party transaction. With the existence of a > full-rbf transaction-relay topology, the multi-party transaction is able > to replace the optout. > > > This makes sense and I would be interested to follow two things once > full-rbf is available in a bitcoin core release: 1. Percentage of > transaction getting replaced 2. Miners profit (Fee for replaced Tx - Fee > for original Tx) > > Can you explain how p2p coinjoin is affected with mempool DoS vector with > some examples? What is considered a p2p coinjoin? Joinmarket or > [Stonewall][1]? > > Selecting a full-node to underpin any serious Bitcoin infrastructure or > secure a significant stack of coins should be submitted to a > fully-fledged decision-making process. Many factors are likely to matter such > as the level of activity of the contributor community, the chain of trust > w.r.t dependencies, the security incident track records, the quality of > the documentation, the exhaustivity and robustness of the set of features, > ... > > > I agree that contributor community and documentation could be improved in > Knots. > > Developers are also Bitcoin users, and they're modifying the software to > suit their use-case needs. And that's exactly the purpose of the > 'full-rbf' PR I'm proposing, aiming to propose a "good" policy for a > Lightning node, without actually seeking to change the default. > > > I like that default still remains opt-in and cool with different policies > being tried out if that helps some users. > > If they're parties interested in implementing more RBF policy options in > Bitcoin Core, I think they're free to propose such changes and invest the > engineering effort to do so. If you're interested in advancing the state of > policy options in Bitcoin Core, there are a lot of interesting resources available > and communities to encourage you in the learning process to contribute to > the codebase [6]. > > > Thanks for sharing the link. I would love to see 5 RBF policies available > to use in bitcoin core. I have already tried experimenting with a few on > regtest and will try to open pull request if there are enough people > interested to test it on other chains (testnet3, signet, mainnet) > > > [1]: https://docs.samourai.io/spend-tools > > > /dev/fd0 > > > Sent with Proton Mail <https://proton.me/> secure email. > > ------- Original Message ------- > On Friday, June 17th, 2022 at 7:04 AM, Antoine Riard < > antoine.riard at gmail.com> wrote: > > Hi alicexbt, > > > Thanks for taking time to review the pull request, > > > > 1)If something relies on a policy which can be changed without breaking > consensus rules, how is it secure in any case with or without full rbf? > > > Your Lightning node software relies on far more software and hardware > components than the transaction-relay p2p network. One could list the > operating system on which is running your Lightning process or the compiler > toolchain turning out your Lightning source code in a binary artifact. > Some weird kernel's memory mapping change could allow access to your > channel funding keys, _without_ breaking the Bitcoin consensus rules [0]. > Moreover, your Lightning node is also relying on the existence of a > global Internet allowing your HTLC transaction to flow from your physical > host to the crowd of transactions confirming in the blockchain. Due to > this "protocol assumption" your channel balance would be vulnerable to > any change in your ISP routing policy, e.g refusing to accept your IPV4 > traffic by a sudden desiderata to impose an IPV6 supremacy. Still > _without_ breaking the Bitcoin consensus rules. Of course, the odds of your > ISP operator adopting this behavior are really low, mostly because your > operator has to bind to social and economic constraints to stay in > business. > > > And I believe this imperative to stay in business is certainly not absent > in the incentives of the Bitcoin node operators. You're free to run any > policy on your node, especially one hardening the safety of your operations beyond > the default one. However, if you start to a transaction-relay > non-compatible with miner incentives, you won't have an efficient view of > the blockspace demand, and from then won't be able to offer compelling > feerates to execute your business transactions to satisfy your client > needs. Or you won't consolidate your wallet UTXOs at times of low-demand. > Indeed, a sane visibility of the mempools might not be critical now for your > Bitcoin operations, but this is not likely to become true with miner's > coinbase reward lowering with time and the system security relying on a > fruitful fee market. > > > So assuming there is a significant number of economically rational > entities running p2p nodes, I think it's a reasonable assumption for > Lightning developers that a policy maximizing miner's income and economic > nodes operations will be widely run on the p2p network, and therefore lay > its security model on that. When there is a gap between the economically > optimal policy (full-rbf) and the effectively deployed one (optin), and > this gap constitutes a flaw for exploitation, I believe it's better to > fix it. > > > If you have a different mode of thinking w.r.t how we should design > protocol in a trust-minimized, open, adversarial environment such as > Bitcoin, I'm curious to listen to it. > > > > If I write a python script that expects user to enter char 'a' or 'b' > but user can enter 'c' and there is no code to handle exceptions or other > chars, will it be secure? > > > Of course not. If you deliver any critical software, you should attach a > solid manual explaining all the corner cases and rough edges. Even better > would be to enshrine the manual directly in your software API to minimize > the footgunish behaviors. E.g, with any ECC library, forbidding to reuse > nonces. If your user still ignores or misread the manual and provides an > insecure input, there is not that much you can do. > > > By analogy, I believe that's the same with Lightning. One recommendation > of the deployment manual would be to be always connected to a full-rbf > transaction-relay topology. Defaulting to this rule and your node exposes > far more surface of attacks. Assuming the manual has been well-written (big > assumption!), I don't think the system designer would be to blame. > > > That said, one issue to confess with current Lightning is our lack of > understanding of what should be figured out in the LN user manual for > safe operations. I would say that's an active area of research [1] [2] [3] > > > > 2)full-rbf is not default in the 2 open pull requests, so this > experiment still relies on users changing RBF policies manually. If > majority of nodes use default opt-in policy, how would this affect > vulnerable projects? > > > If we define the goal as ensuring there is a significant number of > transaction-relay routes between the L2s nodes requiring full-rbf and the > set of miners supporting this policy, and the set of miners is populated > enough, there is no need to convince the majority of nodes operators to > switch to full-rbf. > > > Beyond landing the 'full-rbf' pull request, in pursuit of a partial > full-rbf deployment, I'm thinking of reaching out to Lightning vendors to > recommend running LN nodes operators run their full-node with the setting > enabled. And also to few mining pool operators to advocate the potential > increase in their income. > > > Given there are like 17000 public LN nodes, if half of them adopt full-rbf > it should give already a good number of full-rbf transaction-relay routes > across the p2p network graph. When we're there, we can measure and think > more about how to tune the full-rbf sub-topology. > > > > 2-3% transactions are replaced with opt-in RBF, if someone did not > replace earlier why would they do it with full RBF? > > > Because it's breaking the reliability and security of their use-cases. > Use-cases which didn't exist a few years ago. The mempool DoS vector is > described here [4]. To the best of my understanding, it might affect a > bunch of use-cases, such as dual-funded channels, on-chain DLCs, p2p > coinjoins, batched submarine swaps out. With the attack described, the > honest set of users might not have visibility of the network mempools > that there is a malicious, low-cost, opt-out double-spend preventing the > propagation of their multi-party transaction. With the existence of a > full-rbf transaction-relay topology, the multi-party transaction is able > to replace the optout. > > > None of those use-cases were deployed a few years ago, and the > understanding of the interactions with the mempool policy is still > nascent among their operators. However, if we assume that layering is a way > to grow the Bitcoin ecosystem, as I do, it is reasonable to expect they > will constitute a notable share of the Bitcoin transaction traffic during > the next decade. > > > > I am not opposed to full-rbf; rather, I am opposed to the notion that > full-rbf will solve all problems > > > I wished we had a magic Silver Bullet (tm) solving all the Bitcoin > problems... > > > I'm only advocating a partial full-rbf deployment to solve a real precise > security issue affecting multi-party funded transactions. That said, > full-rbf is far from solving the known set of problems affecting the L2s > due to interactions with network mempools. E,g, see package relay > motivation [5] > > > > I would suggest users to try Bitcoin Knots instead which already has an > option to disable all RBF policies if required, opt-in and full RBF policy. > > > Selecting a full-node to underpin any serious Bitcoin infrastructure or > secure a significant stack of coins should be submitted to a > fully-fledged decision-making process. Many factors are likely to matter > such as the level of activity of the contributor community, the chain of > trust w.r.t dependencies, the security incident track records, the > quality of the documentation, the exhaustivity and robustness of the set of > features, ... > > > This process might take tens of hours, to be duplicated by the number of > node operators who would have to do the full-node vending switch. If you > consider the cognitive cost at the level of the Bitcoin ecosystem, it's > far less costly to implement and review a few lines of codes in Bitcoin > Core. > > > > Developers should provide basic RBF policy options rather than > attempting to define what constitutes a good policy and removing the > ability to disable something when necessary. > > > Of course, this statement assumes there is a clear line between the > developers and the users. Developers are also Bitcoin users, and they're > modifying the software to suit their use-case needs. And that's exactly the > purpose of the 'full-rbf' PR I'm proposing, aiming to propose a "good" > policy for a Lightning node, without actually seeking to change the > default. If they're parties interested in implementing more RBF policy > options in Bitcoin Core, I think they're free to propose such changes and > invest the engineering effort to do so. If you're interested in advancing > the state of policy options in Bitcoin Core, there are a lot of > interesting resources available and communities to encourage you in the > learning process to contribute to the codebase [6]. > > > Antoine > > > [0] https://dirtycow.ninja > > [1] > https://github.com/t-bast/lightning-docs/blob/master/pinning-attacks.md > > [2] https://arxiv.org/pdf/2006.01418.pdf > > [3] https://arxiv.org/pdf/2006.08513.pdf > > [4] > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2021-May/003033.html > > [5] > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2022-May/020493.html > > [6] https://www.summerofbitcoin.org > > > Le jeu. 16 juin 2022 à 00:15, alicexbt <alicexbt at protonmail.com> a écrit : > >> Hi Antoine, >> >> >> Thanks for opening the pull request to add support for full-rbf in >> Bitcoin Core. I have a disagreements with the approach and questions. >> >> Recent discussions among LN devs have brought back on the surface >> concerns about the security of multi-party funded transactions (coinjoins, >> dual-funded LN channels, on-chain DLCs, ...). It turns out there is a >> low-fruit, naive DoS vector playable against the funding flow of any such >> construction due to the lack of existent full-rbf transaction-relay >> topology on today's p2p network [0] [1]. >> >> >> 1)If something relies on a policy which can be changed without breaking >> consensus rules, how is it secure in any case with or without full rbf? If >> I write a python script that expects user to enter char 'a' or 'b' but user >> can enter 'c' and there is no code to handle exceptions or other chars, >> will it be secure? >> >> 2)full-rbf is not default in the 2 open pull requests, so this experiment >> still relies on users changing RBF policies manually. If majority of nodes >> use default opt-in policy, how would this affect vulnerable projects? >> >> If you're a mining operator looking to increase your income, you might be >> interested to experiment with full-rbf as a policy. >> >> >> Miners can only increase their income if users replace transactions. 2-3% >> transactions are replaced with opt-in RBF, if someone did not replace >> earlier why would they do it now even with full RBF? Or even if we add some >> users in it who could not signal for some reasons, do you think it would be >> anything above 5%? >> >> If you're a Bitcoin user or business and you don't like full-rbf, please >> express an opinion on how it might affect your software/operations. I'm >> always interested to learn more about mempool and transaction-relay >> interactions with upper-layers and applications and to listen to feedback >> in those areas, and I guess a lot of other Bitcoin researchers/devs too. I >> know there have been a lot of concerns about full-rbf in the past, however >> I believe the Bitcoin ecosystem has matured a lot since then. >> >> >> I am not opposed to full-rbf; rather, I am opposed to the notion that >> full-rbf will solve all problems and the lack of basic options in Bitcoin >> Core to employ/disable different RBF policies. There is also a speculation >> about making full RBF default in an year which isn't relevant to discuss at >> this point without trying different RBF policies. >> >> I would suggest users to try Bitcoin Knots instead which already has an >> option to disable all RBF policies if required, opt-in and full RBF policy. >> This can also be done using GUI if not familiar with config option >> mempoolreplacement​. >> >> The rationale in PR #16171 was insufficient to justify removing it in the >> first place, had 2 NACKs and was reopened to merge it. Why bother with a >> few lines of code that may allow someone disable it if required in local >> mempool since it's only useful when a big percentage of miners utilize it >> and essentially underused according to the PR author? Developers should >> provide basic RBF policy options rather than attempting to define what >> constitutes a good policy and removing the ability to disable something >> when necessary. >> >> >> /dev/fd0 >> >> Sent with Proton Mail <https://proton.me/> secure email. >> >> ------- Original Message ------- >> On Tuesday, June 14th, 2022 at 5:55 AM, Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev < >> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: >> >> Hi list, >> >> Recent discussions among LN devs have brought back on the surface >> concerns about the security of multi-party funded transactions (coinjoins, >> dual-funded LN channels, on-chain DLCs, ...). It turns out there is a >> low-fruit, naive DoS vector playable against the funding flow of any such >> construction due to the lack of existent full-rbf transaction-relay >> topology on today's p2p network [0] [1]. While it does not consist in a >> direct loss of funds, if exploited well I think it's annoying enough to >> inflict significant timevalue loss or fee-bumping waste >> to the future providers or distributed swarm of users doing multi-party >> funded transactions. Of course, it can be fixed one layer above by >> introducing either fidelity bonds or a reliable centralized coordinator, >> though at the price of an overhead per-participant ressources cost and loss >> in system openness [1]. >> >> For that reason, I believe it would be beneficial to the flourishing of >> multi-party funded transactions to fix the Dos vector by seeing a subset of >> the network running full-rbf and enabling propagation of honest multi-party >> transactions to the interested miners, replacing potential non-signaling >> double-spend from a malicious counterparty. Moving towards that direction, >> I've submitted a small patch against Bitcoin Core enabling it to turn on >> full-rbf as a policy, still under review [3]. The default setting stays >> **false**, i.e keeping opt-in RBF as a default replacement policy. I've >> started to run the patch on a public node at 146.190.224.15. >> >> If you're a node operator curious to play with full-rbf, feel free to >> connect to this node or spawn up a toy, public node yourself. There is a >> ##uafrbf libera chat if you would like information on the settings or >> looking for full-rbf friends (though that step could be automated in the >> future by setting up a dedicated network bit and reserving a few outbound >> slots for them). >> >> If you're a mining operator looking to increase your income, you might be >> interested to experiment with full-rbf as a policy. Indeed, in the future I >> believe the multi-party transactions issuers who need full-rbf to secure >> their funding flow should connect by default to full-rbf peers. One can >> conjecture that their transactions are likely to be more compelling in >> their feerate as their liquidity needs are higher than the simple >> transaction. For today, I think we have really few standards and bitcoin >> softwares relying on multi-party funded transactions [4]. >> >> If you're a Bitcoin user or business and you don't like full-rbf, please >> express an opinion on how it might affect your software/operations. I'm >> always interested to learn more about mempool and transaction-relay >> interactions with upper-layers and applications and to listen to feedback >> in those areas, and I guess a lot of other Bitcoin researchers/devs too. I >> know there have been a lot of concerns about full-rbf in the past, however >> I believe the Bitcoin ecosystem has matured a lot since then. >> >> Any mistakes or missing context is my own. >> >> Cheers, >> Antoine >> >> [0] For more info about replace-by-fee, see >> https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/replace-by-fee/ >> >> [1] For more details about the DoS vector, see >> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2021-May/003033.html >> >> [2] E.g I think it does not affect the Lightning Pool service, as there >> is a preliminary step where the participant funds are locked first in a >> 2-of-2 with the coordinator before being committed in the multi-party batch >> transaction. >> >> [3] https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/25353 >> >> [4] E.g DLCs : >> https://github.com/discreetlogcontracts/dlcspecs/blob/master/Transactions.md >> ; Lightning dual-funded channel : >> https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/851 >> >> >> > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... 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