rich1.0npub1kf0ppcjaguxekg24yx6smgxlu73qn0k8lm0t2wrqc0scpl7u3sgsmf3f58https://nostr.ae/npub1kf0ppcjaguxekg24yx6smgxlu73qn0k8lm0t2wrqc0scpl7u3sgsmf3f58njumphttps://nostr.ae📅 Original date posted:2013-06-04 📝 Original message:On Tue, Jun 4, 2013 at 10:55 AM, John Dillon <john.dillon892 at googlemail.com> wrote: >> I'm one of the people experimenting in this area. I've long argued >> that a zero-output transaction should be permitted -- 100% miner fee >> -- as an elegant proof of sacrifice. Unfortunately that requires a >> hard fork. Also, for most people, it seems likely that a change >> transaction would be generated. That, then, would generate an >> already-standard transaction, where inputs > outputs. > > 100% miner fee is not a proof of anything because the miner could have created > that transaction for themselves. You must have proof that all miners had an > equal opportunity at collecting the fee, and the only way to do that is by > Peter's announce-commit protocol, or his unspendable until after n blocks > proposal. Absolutely. It wholly depends on the security model, and economic-incentives model. Some use models simply don't care if the miner created a transaction that gave the fee to themselves. It might even be /encouraged/ to do this! Sure they are paying themselves, but given bitcoin network difficulty is so high, simply obtaining payments-go-myself-as-miner transactions is itself difficult. Producing an identity (my goal) or whatever is just fine, and in such case becomes simply an additional block reward -- an additional incentive to buy into this identity creation/management system. Or exchange "identity" with another token, for another data service of your choice. This is no longer a strict "proof of sacrifice" system, if such behavior is encouraged, but it is nonetheless valid. -- Jeff Garzik Senior Software Engineer and open source evangelist BitPay, Inc. https://bitpay.com/