rich1.0npub1g5zswf6y48f7fy90jf3tlcuwdmjn8znhzaa4vkmtxaeskca8hpss23ms3lhttps://nostr.ae/npub1g5zswf6y48f7fy90jf3tlcuwdmjn8znhzaa4vkmtxaeskca8hpss23ms3lnjumphttps://nostr.ae📅 Original date posted:2021-10-15 📝 Original message: Good morning Owen, > C now notes that B is lying, but is faced with the dilemma: > > "I could either say 'no' because I can plainly see that B is lying, or > I could say 'yes' and get some free sats from the failed payment (or > via the hope of a successful payment from a capacity increase in the > intervening milliseconds)." Note that if B cannot forward an HTLC to C later, then C cannot have a failed payment and thus cannot earn any money from the upfront payment scheme; thus, at least that part of the incentive is impossible. On the other hand, there is still a positive incentive for continuing the lie --- later, maybe the capacity becomes OK and C could earn both the upfront fee and the success fee. > So C decides it's in his interest to keep the lie going. D, the payee, > can't tell that it's a lie when it reaches her. > > If C did want to tattle, it's important that he be able to do so in a > way that blames B instead of himself, otherwise payers will assume > (incorrectly, and to C's detriment) that the liquidity deficit is with C > rather than B. That is certainly quite possible to do. Regards, ZmnSCPxj