rich1.0npub1uyhgpz5nsfnvdlcqm3erjsdjasd9pdeaejeetwtkvumm6mp3ujlqxt9vwkhttps://nostr.ae/npub1uyhgpz5nsfnvdlcqm3erjsdjasd9pdeaejeetwtkvumm6mp3ujlqxt9vwknjumphttps://nostr.ae📅 Original date posted:2023-05-08 🗒️ Summary of this message: The proposed HTLC endorsement scheme has a vulnerability where local reputation can be abused during high routing fees, and should aim for reputational transitivity. 📝 Original message: Hi, I think the HTLC endorsement scheme as proposed is still suffering from a > vulnerability as local reputation can be built up during periods of low > routing fees, endorsement gained and then abused during periods of high > routing fees. Therefore, it sounds to me this scheme should aim for some > reputational transitivity between incoming traffic and outgoing traffic. > Namely, the acquisition cost of the local reputation should be equal to the > max timevalue damage that one can inflict on a routing node channel > accessible from its local counterparty granting this high-level of > reputation. > This is the reason we have a moving window for the calculation. Note that if there is a channel between Alice and Bob, then the reputation of Alice from Bob's point of view is a function of Bob's total revenue in the latest time period. If Bob experiences a spike in routing fees, nodes might lose their reputation, but it would not work the other way around. That is, one cannot gain reputation during low fee times and use it when fees are high. See further details in this email [0] Best, Clara [0] https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2023-February/003857.html -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: <http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/attachments/20230508/abc0a16c/attachment-0001.html>