<oembed><type>rich</type><version>1.0</version><author_name>npub1ac86vemj7ce5z8jyxt39rna3tvwql6xd30ha3vxcd6esysp23d9qrlswfj</author_name><author_url>https://nostr.ae/npub1ac86vemj7ce5z8jyxt39rna3tvwql6xd30ha3vxcd6esysp23d9qrlswfj</author_url><provider_name>njump</provider_name><provider_url>https://nostr.ae</provider_url><html>📅 Original date posted:2013-05-15&#xA;📝 Original message:On Wed, May 15, 2013 at 07:19:06AM -0400, Peter Todd wrote:&#xA;&gt;Protocols aren&#39;t set in stone - any attacker that controls enough&#xA;&gt;hashing power to pose a 51% attack can simply demand that you use a&#xA;&gt;Bitcoin client modified [to facilitate evaluation of his policy]&#xA;&#xA;Protocol voting is a vote per user policy preference, not a CPU vote, which&#xA;is the point.  Current bitcoin protocol is vulnerable to hard to prove&#xA;arbitrary policies being imposable by a quorum of &gt; 50% miners.  The blind&#xA;commitment proposal fixes that, so even an 99% quorum cant easily impose&#xA;policies, which leaves the weaker protocol vote attack as the remaining&#xA;avenue of attack.  That is a significant qualitative improvement.&#xA;&#xA;The feasibility of protocol voting attacks is an open question, but you&#xA;might want to consider the seeming unstoppability of p2p protocols for a&#xA;hint.&#xA;&#xA;Adam</html></oembed>