rich1.0npub1qf6k0f8p0h89d43l0vnx2xp5yrfgjyl8tg3hkg8jtyudrllgw2usdlfn9ahttps://nostr.ae/npub1qf6k0f8p0h89d43l0vnx2xp5yrfgjyl8tg3hkg8jtyudrllgw2usdlfn9anjumphttps://nostr.ae📅 Original date posted:2015-06-19 📝 Original message:-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 On 2015-06-19 15:37, Eric Lombrozo wrote: > OK, a few things here: > > The Bitcoin network was designed (or should be designed) with the > requirement that it can withstand deliberate double-spend attacks that > can come from anywhere at any time…and relaxing this assumption > without adequately assessing the risk (i.e. I’ve never been hacked > before so I can assume it’s safe) is extremely dangerous at best and > just horrid security practice at worst. Your users might not thank you > for not getting hacked - but they surely will not like it when you DO > get hacked…and lack a proper recovery plan. > > Furthermore, the protocol itself makes no assumptions regarding the > intentions behind someone signing two conflicting transactions. There > are many potential use cases where doing so could make a lot of sense. > Had the protocol been designed along the lines of, say, > tendermint…where signing multiple conflicting blocks results in loss > of one’s funds…then the protocol itself disincentivizes the behavior > without requiring any sort of altruistic, moralistic assumptions. That > would also mean we’d need a different mechanism for the use cases that > things like RBF address. > > Thirdly, taken to the extreme, the viewpoint of “signing a conflicting > transaction is fraud and vandalism” means that if for whatever reason > you attempt to propagate a transaction and nobody mines it for a very > long time, you’re not entitled to immediately reclaim those funds…they > must remain in limbo forever. I'm not talking about changing the protocol - I'm talking about the business relationships between users of Bitcoin. I would expect a payment processor to inform the merchants of relevant double spends that it observes on the network, even if the payment is actually successful, so that the merchant can decide for themselves whether or not to pursue it out of band. Mining is a kind of technical fallback that allows the network to resolve human misbehavior without human intervention. If nobody ever attempted to make a fraudulent payment, we wouldn't need mining at all because the signed transaction itself is proof of intention to pay. That it exists doesn't suddenly make fraud less fraudulent and mean that users who are in a position to pursue out of band recourse shouldn't do so. I agree that there are valid reasons for replacing transactions in the mempool, I just think they should be implemented in a way that doesn't facilitate fraud. I'd also like to note that "prima facie" doesn't mean "always", it means that "the default assumption, unless proven otherwise." -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2 iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJVhDqcAAoJECpf2nDq2eYjX/UP/RlVIGqzwvdKftFW8kRW1+Dk 3befE2vEIEWFAShNt0pk7/Isqk7prRWQDKP+VNZSJfaoyE3akOe7s3OPWuevVRqM Y1N658hYnG6NPebkyp5zUQkjT3mXVxOo9Fw9k7JyHgkWaDcwx330z2n6yztleodq 7hlKdW6sZrgqHw+DoF0Zal3QPN0WYm0XAno3uy71RXOs5cAoUxViuVzWHY0oReTQ uggTggT1A5acmyOM7v65h9Cb2AKcLvHKfSEIwVQbHxYMOT+3GIJOXPKAluh8MjB3 oWg8ERy5dEEHu5kF/MLPQMg5yVQACuQmO2dlmtRoOs3mUQQj+q7dEil/dZMIp0f+ unDKIwLhXMa0sZ+63123UOgaKGZkF7afed3ueniJWQM80VS0WoZvZYhQadT/sCED Ntfxifi1ZqCiKFeshyN9z7jDC8QEJ3N176Kr/wX76h/vvnPYicMEcfRgSE8EGd10 +oRQQpYzb69WPSFRhhrR3yG9Dev1JfzNPEaIKKYerDk9Vo3OnQ3VaaqBNZwBDo46 4r3O5orFES/ZxMdzWE1cWp99n4T4L6KxdZXmfQSYHehUJBnt62vKuEk9X/Li2ZWo i3dr3yxx8xhKGGjsSjG03arz70bkXE7SvrICPOs9OEAdGlJI2liLrSWzYU9BbTle eWvElyVQJsJHgAU8ygvn =77NP -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----