rich1.0npub1vjzmc45k8dgujppapp2ue20h3l9apnsntgv4c0ukncvv549q64gsz4x8ddhttps://nostr.ae/npub1vjzmc45k8dgujppapp2ue20h3l9apnsntgv4c0ukncvv549q64gsz4x8ddnjumphttps://nostr.ae📅 Original date posted:2021-04-23 📝 Original message: Hi, During the lastest years, tx-relay and mempool acceptances rules of the base layer have been sources of major security and operational concerns for Lightning and other Bitcoin second-layers [0]. I think those areas require significant improvements to ease design and deployment of higher Bitcoin layers and I believe this opinion is shared among the L2 dev community. In order to make advancements, it has been discussed a few times in the last months to organize in-person workshops to discuss those issues with the presence of both L1/L2 devs to make exchange fruitful. Unfortunately, I don't think we'll be able to organize such in-person workshops this year (because you know travel is hard those days...) As a substitution, I'm proposing a series of one or more irc meetings. That said, this substitution has the happy benefit to gather far more folks interested by those issues that you can fit in a room. # Scope I would like to propose the following 4 items as topics of discussion. 1) Package relay design or another generic L2 fee-bumping primitive like sponsorship [0]. IMHO, this primitive should at least solve mempools spikes making obsolete propagation of transactions with pre-signed feerate, solve pinning attacks compromising Lightning/multi-party contract protocol safety, offer an usable and stable API to L2 software stack, stay compatible with miner and full-node operators incentives and obviously minimize CPU/memory DoS vectors. 2) Deprecation of opt-in RBF toward full-rbf. Opt-in RBF makes it trivial for an attacker to partition network mempools in divergent subsets and from then launch advanced security or privacy attacks against a Lightning node. Note, it might also be a concern for bandwidth bleeding attacks against L1 nodes. 3) Guidelines about coordinated cross-layers security disclosures. Mitigating a security issue around tx-relay or the mempool in Core might have harmful implications for downstream projects. Ideally, L2 projects maintainers should be ready to upgrade their protocols in emergency in coordination with base layers developers. 4) Guidelines about L2 protocols onchain security design. Currently deployed like Lightning are making a bunch of assumptions on tx-relay and mempool acceptances rules. Those rules are non-normative, non-reliable and lack documentation. Further, they're devoid of tooling to enforce them at runtime [2]. IMHO, it could be preferable to identify a subset of them on which second-layers protocols can do assumptions without encroaching too much on nodes's policy realm or making the base layer development in those areas too cumbersome. I'm aware that some folks are interested in other topics such as extension of Core's mempools package limits or better pricing of RBF replacement. So l propose a 2-week concertation period to submit other topics related to tx-relay or mempools improvements towards L2s before to propose a finalized scope and agenda. # Goals 1) Reaching technical consensus. 2) Reaching technical consensus, before seeking community consensus as it likely has ecosystem-wide implications. 3) Establishing a security incident response policy which can be applied by dev teams in the future. 4) Establishing a philosophy design and associated documentations (BIPs, best practices, ...) # Timeline 2021-04-23: Start of concertation period 2021-05-07: End of concertation period 2021-05-10: Proposition of workshop agenda and schedule late 2021-05/2021-06: IRC meetings As the problem space is savagely wide, I've started a collection of documents to assist this workshop : https://github.com/ariard/L2-zoology Still wip, but I'll have them in a good shape at agenda publication, with reading suggestions and open questions to structure discussions. Also working on transaction pinning and mempool partitions attacks simulations. If L2s security/p2p/mempool is your jam, feel free to get involved :) Cheers, Antoine [0] For e.g see optech section on transaction pinning attacks : https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/transaction-pinning/ [1] https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2020-September/018168.html [2] Lack of reference tooling make it easier to have bug slip in like https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2020-October/002858.html -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: <http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/attachments/20210423/98e1f2cc/attachment.html>