<oembed><type>rich</type><version>1.0</version><author_name>npub1y22yec0znyzw8qndy5qn5c2wgejkj0k9zsqra7kvrd6cd6896z4qm5taj0</author_name><author_url>https://nostr.ae/npub1y22yec0znyzw8qndy5qn5c2wgejkj0k9zsqra7kvrd6cd6896z4qm5taj0</author_url><provider_name>njump</provider_name><provider_url>https://nostr.ae</provider_url><html>📅 Original date posted:2016-06-23&#xA;📝 Original message:AML/KYC is a *side-effect *of a some very important features of BIP0075.&#xA;&#xA;Features that have nothing to do with public names for wallet seeds,&#xA;and moniker *consistency *should be scrapped.&#xA;&#xA;BIP 75 formalises what someone could do today with a bunch of PGP emails&#xA;back and forth.&#xA;&#xA;I create a public key, and I exchange it via QR code with you.   From then&#xA;on, You can initiate invoice requests with me, knowing my moniker is the&#xA;same as it was the last time.   I publish this key to a server (via DNSSEC)&#xA;so anyone can obtain it.   Sounds exactly like PGP.&#xA;&#xA;Identity in BIP 75 is merely &#34;moniker consistency&#34;.  Nothing says that&#xA;identity has to be &#34;real&#34;... only publicly verifiably consistent and&#xA;accessible.  This consistency and the ability to have public names for both&#xA;merchants and users are the important features of BIP 075.&#xA;&#xA;Other features linking monikers to real-world identity should be surgically&#xA;removed from the standard.&#xA;&#xA;- Users need to be able to send Bitcoin to an address without MITM attacks&#xA;during the address exchange.&#xA;&#xA;- Merchants need to be able to supply memorable names linked to internet&#xA;services, like web servers and email addresses.&#xA;&#xA;- Merchants and users both need to be able to initiate transaction&#xA;off-chain, with a workflow that allows things like rejection, subscription,&#xA;etc.&#xA;&#xA;&#xA;&#xA;On Thu, Jun 23, 2016 at 6:56 AM, Peter Todd &lt;pete at petertodd.org&gt; wrote:&#xA;&#xA;&gt; On Tue, Jun 21, 2016 at 05:14:31PM -0700, Justin Newton wrote:&#xA;&gt; &gt; On Tue, Jun 21, 2016 at 3:13 PM, Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev &lt;&#xA;&gt; &gt; Hi Peter,&#xA;&gt; &gt;    Certainly AML/KYC compliance is one of the use cases that BIP 75 and&#xA;&gt; our&#xA;&gt; &gt; certificates can support.  As a quick summary,&#xA;&gt; &gt;&#xA;&gt; &gt; There are individuals and entities that would like to buy, sell, and use&#xA;&gt; &gt; bitcoin, and other public blockchains, but that have compliance&#xA;&gt; &gt; requirements that they need to meet before they can do so.  Similarly,&#xA;&gt; &gt; companies and entrepreneurs in the space suffer under the potential&#xA;&gt; threat&#xA;&gt; &gt; of fines, or in extreme cases, jail time, also for not meeting AML or&#xA;&gt; &gt; sanctions list compliance.  We wanted to build tools that allowed&#xA;&gt; &gt; entrepreneurs to breathe easy, while at the same time allow more people&#xA;&gt; and&#xA;&gt; &gt; companies to enter the ecosystem.  We also believe that the solution we&#xA;&gt; are&#xA;&gt; &gt; using has the characteristics that you want in such a solution, for&#xA;&gt; example:&#xA;&gt; &gt;&#xA;&gt; &gt; 1&gt; Only the counterparties (and possibly their service providers in the&#xA;&gt; &gt; case of hosted services) in a transaction can see the identity data,&#xA;&gt; &gt; protecting user privacy.&#xA;&gt; &gt;&#xA;&gt; &gt; 2&gt; The counterparties themselves (and possibly their service providers in&#xA;&gt; &gt; the case of hosted services) decide whether identity information is&#xA;&gt; &gt; required for any given transaction.&#xA;&gt; &gt;&#xA;&gt; &gt; 3&gt; No trace is left on the blockchain or anywhere else (other than with&#xA;&gt; the&#xA;&gt; &gt; counterparties) that identity information was even exchanged, protecting&#xA;&gt; &gt; fungibility&#xA;&gt; &gt;&#xA;&gt; &gt; 4&gt; The solution is based on open source and open standards, allowing open&#xA;&gt; &gt; permissionless innovation, versus parties building closed networks based&#xA;&gt; on&#xA;&gt; &gt; closed standards.  The very fact that this solution went through the BIP&#xA;&gt; &gt; process and was adapted based on feedback is an example of how this is&#xA;&gt; &gt; better for users than the inevitable closed solution that would arise if&#xA;&gt; &gt; the open source, community vetted version didn’t already exist.&#xA;&gt; &gt;&#xA;&gt; &gt; I don’t know if you are opposed to organizations that have AML&#xA;&gt; requirements&#xA;&gt; &gt; from using the bitcoin blockchain, but if you aren’t, why wouldn’t you&#xA;&gt; &gt; prefer an open source, open standards based solution to exclusionary,&#xA;&gt; &gt; proprietary ones?&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt; In some (most?) countries, it is illegal to offer telecoms services without&#xA;&gt; wiretap facilities. Does that mean Tor builds into its software &#34;open&#xA;&gt; source&#34;&#xA;&gt; &#34;open standards&#34; wiretapping functionality? No. And interestingly, people&#xA;&gt; trying to add support for that stuff is actually a thing that keeps&#xA;&gt; happening&#xA;&gt; in the Tor community...&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt; In any case, I&#39;d strongly argue that we remove BIP75 from the bips&#xA;&gt; repository,&#xA;&gt; and boycott wallets that implement it. It&#39;s bad strategy for Bitcoin&#xA;&gt; developers&#xA;&gt; to willingly participate in AML/KYC, just the same way as it&#39;s bad for Tor&#xA;&gt; to&#xA;&gt; add wiretapping functionality, and W3C to support DRM tech. The minor&#xA;&gt; tactical&#xA;&gt; wins you&#39;ll get our of this aren&#39;t worth it.&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt; --&#xA;&gt; https://petertodd.org &#39;peter&#39;[:-1]@petertodd.org&#xA;&gt;&#xA;-------------- next part --------------&#xA;An HTML attachment was scrubbed...&#xA;URL: &lt;http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20160623/07cec89c/attachment.html&gt;</html></oembed>