<oembed><type>rich</type><version>1.0</version><author_name>npub1r3san9v5njl6798hvauyu9ntm6r9c7u8s0t65wls58gpfdcvqp5sa48d0u</author_name><author_url>https://nostr.ae/npub1r3san9v5njl6798hvauyu9ntm6r9c7u8s0t65wls58gpfdcvqp5sa48d0u</author_url><provider_name>njump</provider_name><provider_url>https://nostr.ae</provider_url><html>📅 Original date posted:2015-06-12&#xA;📝 Original message:Peter it&#39;s not clear to me that your described protocol is free of miner&#xA;influence over the vote, by artificially generating transactions which they&#xA;claim in their own blocks, or conforming incentives among voters by opting&#xA;to be with the (slight) majority in order to minimize fees.&#xA;&#xA;Wouldn&#39;t it in fact be simpler to use the dynamic block size adjustment&#xA;algorithm presented to the list a few weeks back, where the miner opts for&#xA;a larger block by sacrificing fees? In that way the users &#34;vote&#34; for larger&#xA;blocks by including sufficient fees to offset subsidy, but as it is an&#xA;economic incentives miners gain nothing by inflating the fees in their own&#xA;blocks.&#xA;&#xA;On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 11:11 AM, Peter Todd &lt;pete at petertodd.org&gt; wrote:&#xA;&#xA;&gt; Jeff Garzik recently proposed that the upper blocksize limit be removed&#xA;&gt; entirely, with a &#34;soft&#34; limit being enforced via miner vote, recorded by&#xA;&gt; hashing power.&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt; This mechanism within the protocol for users to have any influence over&#xA;&gt; the miner vote. We can add that back by providing a way for transactions&#xA;&gt; themselves to set a flag determining whether or not they can be included&#xA;&gt; in a block casting a specific vote.&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt; We can simplify Garzik&#39;s vote to say that one of the nVersion bits&#xA;&gt; either votes for the blocksize to be increased, or decreased, by some&#xA;&gt; fixed ratio (e.g 2x or 1/2x) the next interval. Then we can use a&#xA;&gt; nVersion bit in transactions themselves, also voting for an increase or&#xA;&gt; decrease. Transactions may only be included in blocks with an&#xA;&gt; indentical vote, thus providing miners with a monetary incentive via&#xA;&gt; fees to vote according to user wishes.&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt; Of course, to cast a &#34;don&#39;t care&#34; vote we can either define an&#xA;&gt; additional bit, or sign the transaction with both versions. Equally we&#xA;&gt; can even have different versions with different fees, broadcast via a&#xA;&gt; mechanism such as replace-by-fee.&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt; See also John Dillon&#39;s proposal for proof-of-stake blocksize voting:&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt; https://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net/msg02323.html&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt; --&#xA;&gt; &#39;peter&#39;[:-1]@petertodd.org&#xA;&gt; 0000000000000000127ab1d576dc851f374424f1269c4700ccaba2c42d97e778&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt; ------------------------------------------------------------------------------&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt; _______________________________________________&#xA;&gt; Bitcoin-development mailing list&#xA;&gt; Bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net&#xA;&gt; https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt;&#xA;-------------- next part --------------&#xA;An HTML attachment was scrubbed...&#xA;URL: &lt;http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20150612/89a6898b/attachment.html&gt;</html></oembed>