rich1.0npub10zyxjrelgpp85qc93pnt8e4yx0jsxm27sn9lsypkhlrttjpmjktqkqsg9ahttps://nostr.ae/npub10zyxjrelgpp85qc93pnt8e4yx0jsxm27sn9lsypkhlrttjpmjktqkqsg9anjumphttps://nostr.ae📅 Original date posted:2015-06-19 📝 Original message:I have some experience here. If you are seriously suggesting these measures, you might as well kill retail transactions altogether. In practice, if a retail place starts to accept bitcoin they have a similar situation as with cash, only that the fraud potential is much lower. (e.g. 100-dollar bill for a sandwich might turn out fake later) and the fraud frequency is also much lower. 0-conf concerns were never a problem in practice. except for 2-way atms i have never heard of a problem that was caused by double spends. while adding these measures is generally positive, requiring them means excluding 99.9% of the potential users. so you might as well not do it. RBF as implemented by F2Pool just flat out lowers Bitcoins utility value. So it's a bad thing. for any online or automated system, waiting for a handful of confirmations was always recommended practice. Am 19.06.2015 um 22:39 schrieb Matt Whitlock: > Retail POS merchants probably should not be accepting vanilla Bitcoin > payments, as Bitcoin alone does not (and cannot) guarantee the > irreversibility of a transaction until it has been buried several > blocks deep in the chain. Retail merchants should be requiring a > co-signature from a mutually trusted co-signer that vows never to sign > a double-spend. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: 0xAA4EDEEF.asc Type: application/pgp-keys Size: 998 bytes Desc: not available URL: <http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20150620/84f25498/attachment.bin>