<oembed><type>rich</type><version>1.0</version><author_name>npub1zq3c5mgvdpyvrt9evdtn48d47du4s03fxdjrvx7cv3mtf93hqjgqj53esn</author_name><author_url>https://nostr.ae/npub1zq3c5mgvdpyvrt9evdtn48d47du4s03fxdjrvx7cv3mtf93hqjgqj53esn</author_url><provider_name>njump</provider_name><provider_url>https://nostr.ae</provider_url><html>📅 Original date posted:2015-06-14&#xA;📝 Original message:While this idea is theoretically interesting because it involves many stakeholders, rather than just miners, I think in practice this would not work very well. Users don&#39;t want to worry about this kind of technicality, they just want to be able to make a transaction and have it be processed. &#xA;&#xA;In addition, while this gives stakeholders some weight with the fees they supply, these fees are marginal compared to the block size subsidy. If this proposal were actually implemented, I think miners would vote for whatever they think is best, and users would not contradict them with their votes to ensure a fast confirmation time. Users are incentivized to be in agreement with miners because the miners provide them with the confirmations they need, but fees do not provide a great incentive for miners to be in agreement with users, and likely won&#39;t for some time. &#xA;&#xA;Best, &#xA;Stephen &#xA;&#xA;&#xA;&#xA;&#xA;&gt; On Jun 12, 2015, at 2:11 PM, Peter Todd &lt;pete at petertodd.org&gt; wrote:&#xA;&gt; &#xA;&gt; Jeff Garzik recently proposed that the upper blocksize limit be removed&#xA;&gt; entirely, with a &#34;soft&#34; limit being enforced via miner vote, recorded by&#xA;&gt; hashing power.&#xA;&gt; &#xA;&gt; This mechanism within the protocol for users to have any influence over&#xA;&gt; the miner vote. We can add that back by providing a way for transactions&#xA;&gt; themselves to set a flag determining whether or not they can be included&#xA;&gt; in a block casting a specific vote.&#xA;&gt; &#xA;&gt; We can simplify Garzik&#39;s vote to say that one of the nVersion bits&#xA;&gt; either votes for the blocksize to be increased, or decreased, by some&#xA;&gt; fixed ratio (e.g 2x or 1/2x) the next interval. Then we can use a&#xA;&gt; nVersion bit in transactions themselves, also voting for an increase or&#xA;&gt; decrease. Transactions may only be included in blocks with an&#xA;&gt; indentical vote, thus providing miners with a monetary incentive via&#xA;&gt; fees to vote according to user wishes.&#xA;&gt; &#xA;&gt; Of course, to cast a &#34;don&#39;t care&#34; vote we can either define an&#xA;&gt; additional bit, or sign the transaction with both versions. Equally we&#xA;&gt; can even have different versions with different fees, broadcast via a&#xA;&gt; mechanism such as replace-by-fee.&#xA;&gt; &#xA;&gt; &#xA;&gt; See also John Dillon&#39;s proposal for proof-of-stake blocksize voting:&#xA;&gt; &#xA;&gt; https://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net/msg02323.html&#xA;&gt; &#xA;&gt; -- &#xA;&gt; &#39;peter&#39;[:-1]@petertodd.org&#xA;&gt; 0000000000000000127ab1d576dc851f374424f1269c4700ccaba2c42d97e778&#xA;&gt; ------------------------------------------------------------------------------&#xA;&gt; _______________________________________________&#xA;&gt; Bitcoin-development mailing list&#xA;&gt; Bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net&#xA;&gt; https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development</html></oembed>