rich1.0npub17ty4mumkv43w8wtt0xsz2jypck0gvw0j8xrcg6tpea25z2nh7meqf4qgydhttps://nostr.ae/npub17ty4mumkv43w8wtt0xsz2jypck0gvw0j8xrcg6tpea25z2nh7meqf4qgydnjumphttps://nostr.ae📅 Original date posted:2014-04-23 📝 Original message:On Wed, Apr 23, 2014 at 2:43 PM, Christophe Biocca < christophe.biocca at gmail.com> wrote: > 1. This provides a very strong incentive to always vote for > reallocating a block if it isn't yours If everyone votes to reallocate everyone elses blocks all the time, then you'd end up losing your own coins too, so this doesn't seem like a workable strategy. > a) Requiring supermajorities > c) Burning, rather than reallocating, the coins. Miners' immediate > incentive to attack honest pools is much reduced. > I'm OK with burning actually. The total amount of coins in the system essentially defines its maximum price resolution. Ideally we'd not lose resolution, but it's less important than having a system that does actually work. Moreover, this sort of system is like double spending defence itself - if it does work, it doesn't need to actually be done very frequently because people know the safeguards work and don't try. So in practice total loss of resolution should be limited. > 2. BitUndo gets paid using additional txouts in the double-spend > transaction, no by miner's fees. Right. It's indeed an assumption that block rewards matter to miners, even the ones that have double spend revenues. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: <http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20140423/53570a01/attachment.html>