<oembed><type>rich</type><version>1.0</version><author_name>npub1m230cem2yh3mtdzkg32qhj73uytgkyg5ylxsu083n3tpjnajxx4qqa2np2</author_name><author_url>https://nostr.ae/npub1m230cem2yh3mtdzkg32qhj73uytgkyg5ylxsu083n3tpjnajxx4qqa2np2</author_url><provider_name>njump</provider_name><provider_url>https://nostr.ae</provider_url><html>📅 Original date posted:2015-12-28&#xA;📝 Original message:On Sat, Dec 26, 2015 at 12:12:13AM -0800, Multipool Admin wrote:&#xA;&gt; Any attempt to &#39;fix&#39; this problem, would most likely require changes to all&#xA;&gt; mining software, why not just make mining more decentralized in general?&#xA;&gt; &#xA;&gt; For example, allow anyone to submit proofs of work to Bitcoind that are&#xA;&gt; some fraction of the network difficulty and receive payment for them if&#xA;&gt; they&#39;re valid.  This would also encourage the proliferation of full nodes&#xA;&gt; since anyone could solo mine again.  Then, the next coinbase transaction&#xA;&gt; could be split among, say, the top 100 proofs of work.&#xA;&#xA;That&#39;s certainly be a good place to be, but the design of Bitcoin&#xA;currently makes achieving that goal fundementally difficult. &#xA;&#xA;&gt; Eligius already does their miner payouts like this.&#xA;&gt; &#xA;&gt; If you want to fix an issue with mining, fix the selfish mining issue first&#xA;&gt; as it&#39;s a much larger and more dangerous potential issue.&#xA;&#xA;Do you specifically mean selfish mining as defined in Emin Gün&#xA;Sirer/Ittay Eyal&#39;s paper? Keep in mind that attack is only a significant&#xA;issue in a scenario - one malicious miner with &gt;30% hashing power -&#xA;where you&#39;re already very close to the margins anyway; the difference&#xA;between a 50% attack threshold and a 30% attack threshold isn&#39;t very&#xA;significant.&#xA;&#xA;Far more concerning is network propagation effects between large and&#xA;small miners. For that class of issues, if you are in an environemnt&#xA;where selfish mining is possible - a fairly flat, easily DoS/sybil&#xA;attacked network topology - the profitability difference between small&#xA;and large miners even *without* attacks going on is a hugely worrying&#xA;problem. OTOH, if you&#39;re blocksize is small enough that propagation time&#xA;is negligable to profitability, then selfish mining attacks with &lt;30%&#xA;hashing power aren&#39;t much of a concern - they&#39;ll be naturally defeated&#xA;by anti-DoS/anti-sybil measures.&#xA;&#xA;&gt; I don&#39;t believe it was ever clearly established whether Eligius suffered a&#xA;&gt; block withholding attack or was just the victim of a miner with (what was,&#xA;&gt; at the time) a large amount of faulty hardware, however, from the&#xA;&gt; Bitcointalk threads at the time I believe it was assumed to be the latter.&#xA;&#xA;I think the latter was assumed as well, although ruling out of the&#xA;former is impossible.&#xA;&#xA;Note though that Eligius is *not* the only pool to have had problems&#xA;with block withholding, though AFAIK Eligius is the only one who has&#xA;gone on record so far. (as I said in my original post, I&#39;m relaying&#xA;information given to me under condition of confidentiality)&#xA;&#xA;-- &#xA;&#39;peter&#39;[:-1]@petertodd.org&#xA;000000000000000004a36565fb282c4bd06dda61329fda2465b0bfeaf7241dab&#xA;-------------- next part --------------&#xA;A non-text attachment was scrubbed...&#xA;Name: signature.asc&#xA;Type: application/pgp-signature&#xA;Size: 650 bytes&#xA;Desc: Digital signature&#xA;URL: &lt;http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20151228/1e23dd8a/attachment.sig&gt;</html></oembed>