rich1.0npub14vwgt02663pkxx54kg5t693shaavmvnldhsp49sve7asw7p36lkqljyksmhttps://nostr.ae/npub14vwgt02663pkxx54kg5t693shaavmvnldhsp49sve7asw7p36lkqljyksmnjumphttps://nostr.ae📅 Original date posted:2015-12-20 📝 Original message:Chris Priest 於 2015-12-19 22:47 寫到: > On 12/19/15, jl2012 <jl2012 at xbt.hk> wrote: >> Chris Priest via bitcoin-dev 於 2015-12-19 22:34 寫到: >>> Block witholding attacks are only possible if you have a majority of >>> hashpower. If you only have 20% hashpower, you can't do this attack. >>> Currently, this attack is only a theoretical attack, as the ones with >>> all the hashpower today are not engaging in this behavior. Even if >>> someone who had a lot of hashpower decided to pull off this attack, >>> they wouldn't be able to disrupt much. Once that time comes, then I >>> think this problem should be solved, until then it should be a low >>> priority. There are more important things to work on in the meantime. >>> >> >> This is not true. For a pool with 5% total hash rate, an attacker only >> needs 0.5% of hash rate to sabotage 10% of their income. It's already >> enough to kill the pool >> >> > > This begs the question: If this is such a devastating attack, then why > hasn't this attack brought down every pool in existence? As far as I'm > aware, there are many pools in operation despite this possibility. It did happen: https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/28242v/eligius_falls_victim_to_blocksolution_withholding/ The worst thing is that the proof for such attack is probabilistic, not deterministic. A smarter attacker may even pretend to be many small miners, make it even more difficult or impossible to prove who are attacking. > Then shouldn't this be something the pool deals with, not the bitcoin > protocol? The only solution is to ask for KYC registration, unless one could propose a cryptographic solution that does not require a consensus fork.