<oembed><type>rich</type><version>1.0</version><author_name>npub17kz55p7ysz4ftvq2xyr2zamc776cygwcm5fdz8ndj3jm5umm65xq4sr5tq</author_name><author_url>https://nostr.ae/npub17kz55p7ysz4ftvq2xyr2zamc776cygwcm5fdz8ndj3jm5umm65xq4sr5tq</author_url><provider_name>njump</provider_name><provider_url>https://nostr.ae</provider_url><html>📅 Original date posted:2015-06-12&#xA;📝 Original message:This is a misguided idea, to say the least. If such a mechanism of of&#xA;user input would be possible, one would use it for transaction&#xA;verification in the first place. In proof-of-stake outcomes are&#xA;determined by vote by stake (that vote has very different&#xA;characteristics than vote by compute power). There is no such thing as&#xA;making it possible to determine what &#34;users want&#34;. That&#39;s what the&#xA;proof-of-work mechanism does in the first place, only that it is now&#xA;unfortunately skewed/corrupted/(whatever you want to call it). Before&#xA;centralization the concept of &#34;miners&#34; didn&#39;t exist in Bitcoin and&#xA;miners were roughly identical to users. Peer-to-Peer implies only one&#xA;class of users.&#xA;&#xA;A big problem with such a vote (in PoW and PoS): miners get paid for&#xA;their work and have incentives to raise fees. Those who pay fees would&#xA;have no say in whether those fees are fair or not. Transaction&#xA;verification has to be roughly profitable, but there is no fixed&#xA;formula for determining profitability.&#xA;&#xA;On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 8:26 PM, Matt Whitlock &lt;bip at mattwhitlock.name&gt; wrote:&#xA;&gt; On Friday, 12 June 2015, at 11:20 am, Mark Friedenbach wrote:&#xA;&gt;&gt; Peter it&#39;s not clear to me that your described protocol is free of miner&#xA;&gt;&gt; influence over the vote, by artificially generating transactions which they&#xA;&gt;&gt; claim in their own blocks&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt; Miners could fill their blocks with garbage transactions that agree with their vote, but this wouldn&#39;t bring them any real income, as they&#39;d be paying their own money as fees to themselves. To get real income, miners would have to vote in accordance with real users.&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt; ------------------------------------------------------------------------------&#xA;&gt; _______________________________________________&#xA;&gt; Bitcoin-development mailing list&#xA;&gt; Bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net&#xA;&gt; https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development&#xA;&#xA;On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 8:34 PM, Peter Todd &lt;pete at petertodd.org&gt; wrote:&#xA;&gt; On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 02:22:36PM -0400, Matt Whitlock wrote:&#xA;&gt;&gt; Why should miners only be able to vote for &#34;double the limit&#34; or &#34;halve&#34; the limit? If you&#39;re going to use bits, I think you need to use two bits:&#xA;&gt;&gt;&#xA;&gt;&gt;       0 0 = no preference (&#34;wildcard&#34; vote)&#xA;&gt;&gt;       0 1 = vote for the limit to remain the same&#xA;&gt;&gt;       1 0 = vote for the limit to be halved&#xA;&gt;&gt;       1 1 = vote for the limit to be doubled&#xA;&gt;&gt;&#xA;&gt;&gt; User transactions would follow the same usage. In particular, a user vote of &#34;0 0&#34; (no preference) could be included in a block casting any vote, but a block voting &#34;0 0&#34; (no preference) could only contain transactions voting &#34;0 0&#34; as well.&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt; Sounds like a good encoding to me. Taking the median of the three&#xA;&gt; options, and throwing away &#34;don&#39;t care&#34; votes entirely, makes sense.&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt;&gt; Incidentally, I love this idea, as it addresses a concern I immediately had with Jeff&#39;s proposal, which is that it hands control exclusively to the miners. And your proposal here fixes that shortcoming in a economically powerful way: miners lose out on fees if they don&#39;t represent the wishes of the users.&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt; Thanks! I personally expect disaster to ensue with this kind of&#xA;&gt; proposal, but I&#39;m less concerned if the disaster is something users&#xA;&gt; explicitly allowed to happen in a consensual way.&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt; --&#xA;&gt; &#39;peter&#39;[:-1]@petertodd.org&#xA;&gt; 0000000000000000127ab1d576dc851f374424f1269c4700ccaba2c42d97e778&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt; ------------------------------------------------------------------------------&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt; _______________________________________________&#xA;&gt; Bitcoin-development mailing list&#xA;&gt; Bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net&#xA;&gt; https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&#xA;On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 8:36 PM, Peter Todd &lt;pete at petertodd.org&gt; wrote:&#xA;&gt; On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 02:26:20PM -0400, Matt Whitlock wrote:&#xA;&gt;&gt; On Friday, 12 June 2015, at 11:20 am, Mark Friedenbach wrote:&#xA;&gt;&gt; &gt; Peter it&#39;s not clear to me that your described protocol is free of miner&#xA;&gt;&gt; &gt; influence over the vote, by artificially generating transactions which they&#xA;&gt;&gt; &gt; claim in their own blocks&#xA;&gt;&gt;&#xA;&gt;&gt; Miners could fill their blocks with garbage transactions that agree with their vote, but this wouldn&#39;t bring them any real income, as they&#39;d be paying their own money as fees to themselves. To get real income, miners would have to vote in accordance with real users.&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt; Exactly. I very explicitly am proposing that we consider giving users a&#xA;&gt; mechanism to pay for votes to give them a way to directly influence the&#xA;&gt; outcome.&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt; --&#xA;&gt; &#39;peter&#39;[:-1]@petertodd.org&#xA;&gt; 0000000000000000127ab1d576dc851f374424f1269c4700ccaba2c42d97e778&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt; ------------------------------------------------------------------------------&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt; _______________________________________________&#xA;&gt; Bitcoin-development mailing list&#xA;&gt; Bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net&#xA;&gt; https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&#xA;On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 8:36 PM, Matt Whitlock &lt;bip at mattwhitlock.name&gt; wrote:&#xA;&gt; On Friday, 12 June 2015, at 7:34 pm, Peter Todd wrote:&#xA;&gt;&gt; On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 02:22:36PM -0400, Matt Whitlock wrote:&#xA;&gt;&gt; &gt; Why should miners only be able to vote for &#34;double the limit&#34; or &#34;halve&#34; the limit? If you&#39;re going to use bits, I think you need to use two bits:&#xA;&gt;&gt; &gt;&#xA;&gt;&gt; &gt;     0 0 = no preference (&#34;wildcard&#34; vote)&#xA;&gt;&gt; &gt;     0 1 = vote for the limit to remain the same&#xA;&gt;&gt; &gt;     1 0 = vote for the limit to be halved&#xA;&gt;&gt; &gt;     1 1 = vote for the limit to be doubled&#xA;&gt;&gt; &gt;&#xA;&gt;&gt; &gt; User transactions would follow the same usage. In particular, a user vote of &#34;0 0&#34; (no preference) could be included in a block casting any vote, but a block voting &#34;0 0&#34; (no preference) could only contain transactions voting &#34;0 0&#34; as well.&#xA;&gt;&gt;&#xA;&gt;&gt; Sounds like a good encoding to me. Taking the median of the three&#xA;&gt;&gt; options, and throwing away &#34;don&#39;t care&#34; votes entirely, makes sense.&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt; I hope you mean the *plurality* of the three options after throwing away the &#34;don&#39;t cares,&#34; not the *median*.&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt; ------------------------------------------------------------------------------&#xA;&gt; _______________________________________________&#xA;&gt; Bitcoin-development mailing list&#xA;&gt; Bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net&#xA;&gt; https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development</html></oembed>