rich1.0npub17qxssk9sj2r7jswvh3y32e7vwz7mcckhz33gk9nurdmw0lhsfkgswupwethttps://nostr.ae/npub17qxssk9sj2r7jswvh3y32e7vwz7mcckhz33gk9nurdmw0lhsfkgswupwetnjumphttps://nostr.ae📅 Original date posted:2015-08-28 📝 Original message:This is the best proposal I've seen yet. Allow me to summarize: • It addresses the problem, in Jeff Garzik's BIP 100, of miners selling their block-size votes. • It addresses the problem, in Gavin Andresen's BIP 101, of blindly trying to predict future market needs versus future technological capacities. • It avoids a large step discontinuity in the block-size limit by starting with a 1-MB limit. • It throttles changes to ±10% every 2016 blocks. • It imposes a tangible cost (higher difficulty) on miners who vote to raise the block-size limit. • It avoids incentivizing miners to vote to lower the block-size limit. However, this proposal currently fails to answer a very important question: • What is the mechanism for activation of the new consensus rule? It is when a certain percentage of the blocks mined in a 2016-block retargeting period contain valid block-size votes? https://github.com/btcdrak/bips/blob/bip-cbbsra/bip-cbbrsa.mediawiki On Friday, 28 August 2015, at 9:28 pm, Btc Drak via bitcoin-dev wrote: > Pull request: https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/pull/187