<oembed><type>rich</type><version>1.0</version><author_name>npub17ty4mumkv43w8wtt0xsz2jypck0gvw0j8xrcg6tpea25z2nh7meqf4qgyd</author_name><author_url>https://nostr.ae/npub17ty4mumkv43w8wtt0xsz2jypck0gvw0j8xrcg6tpea25z2nh7meqf4qgyd</author_url><provider_name>njump</provider_name><provider_url>https://nostr.ae</provider_url><html>📅 Original date posted:2014-04-24&#xA;📝 Original message:On Thu, Apr 24, 2014 at 1:22 PM, Jorge Timón &lt;jtimon at monetize.io&gt; wrote:&#xA;&#xA;&gt; &gt; I&#39;m using it in the same sense Satoshi used it. Honest miners work to&#xA;&gt; &gt; prevent double spends. That&#39;s the entire justification for their&#xA;&gt; existence.&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt; I thought the mechanism they used to prevent double-spends was proof of&#xA;&gt; work.&#xA;&gt; Therefore dishonest miners where only those who mine on top of a block&#xA;&gt; which is not the longest valid chain they&#39;ve seen.&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&#xA;No! This is a misunderstanding. The mechanism they use to prevent double&#xA;spends is to *ignore double spends*. The blocks they created indicate the&#xA;ordering of transactions they saw and proof of work is used to arrive at a&#xA;shared consensus ordering given the possibility that transactions arrived&#xA;at different times.&#xA;&#xA;I&#39;m continually amazed at how many people seem to see the current algorithm&#xA;as the goal in and of itself, instead of an imperfect but workable means of&#xA;achieving the actual goal.&#xA;&#xA;To distinguish this definition from your own &#34;honest miners are those&#xA;&gt; who decide on double-spends by mining the transaction they saw first&#34;&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&#xA;This definition of honesty is not my own, the one Bitcoin has always used.&#xA;Obviously if Satoshi had wanted transactions to be double spendable by fee&#xA;in the mempool he would have made Bitcoin work that way, instead of coming&#xA;up with the nSequence based replacement scheme instead.&#xA;&#xA;First-seen *is* a protocol rule, as much as Set-Cookie storing data in a&#xA;browser is an HTTP protocol rule. The fact that auditing compliance with it&#xA;is harder to do than some others does not make it less of a rule.&#xA;&#xA;I completely disagree.&#xA;&gt; Miner&#39;s proof of work makes transactions irreversible.&#xA;&#xA;&#xA;Again you are hopelessly confused. Miners that are trying to double spend&#xA;are *by definition* not making transactions irreversible, they are trying&#xA;to make transactions reversible.&#xA;&#xA;Look at it this way. There is no inherent reason BitUndo has to undo only&#xA;Finney attacks. If it gets sufficient hash power it could offer undoing of&#xA;1-confirm transactions too, right? Sure it&#39;ll mostly fail but that&#39;s&#xA;already a part of its business model. Sometimes it&#39;ll get two blocks in a&#xA;row and succeed. It&#39;s a very minor tweak to what they&#39;re doing. Would you&#xA;argue these miners are still useful? After all, it&#39;s impossible to be&#xA;certain after the fact that miners built on top of the &#34;wrong&#34; block&#xA;because forks occur naturally.&#xA;&#xA;&#xA;&gt; Even if you always had to wait for transactions to be confirmed with&#xA;&gt; some irreversible proof of work (as described in Satoshi&#39;s&#xA;&gt; whitepaper), it doesn&#39;t follow that &#34;automatically resolves the&#xA;&gt; Bitcoin experiment as a failure&#34;. I don&#39;t understand how can you&#xA;&gt; conclude that.&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&#xA;What I said is, if you believe all miners are willing to double spend for a&#xA;fee then this resolves the experiment as a failure. This is also obvious -&#xA;if you can pay miners to go back and rewrite the chain at will, Bitcoin&#xA;doesn&#39;t work.&#xA;&#xA;Consider the incentives. Let&#39;s say all miners are &#34;smart&#34; in your&#xA;estimation and are willing to double spend transactions for higher fees.&#xA;Because all miners follow this ridiculous policy, they should be willing to&#xA;fork the chain at any point to claim the higher fee on the new tx. After&#xA;all, although they will throw away the work they did on the previous chain,&#xA;if the fee on the new tx is high enough to balance this then it can be&#xA;profitable for them to do it.&#xA;&#xA;Because a double spender can afford to give nearly all of his new tx away&#xA;in fees, this means even txns well buried in the chain can be profitably&#xA;double spent: even if the double spender gets back only 10% of the&#xA;transferred amount, if it was a big transfer for some expensive object,&#xA;they still win! They got object + 10%&#xA;&#xA;Do you see now why your definition of honesty is completely broken?&#xA;-------------- next part --------------&#xA;An HTML attachment was scrubbed...&#xA;URL: &lt;http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20140424/65f8c640/attachment.html&gt;</html></oembed>