rich1.0npub1xqshkqv2g7uea4xzqwvmgjcz7u8vfavw6aazs999v0azsv3w7u3qpymc2phttps://nostr.ae/npub1xqshkqv2g7uea4xzqwvmgjcz7u8vfavw6aazs999v0azsv3w7u3qpymc2pnjumphttps://nostr.ae📅 Original date posted:2014-05-21 📝 Original message:Hello Chris, On Wed, May 21, 2014 at 6:39 PM, Chris Beams <chris at beams.io> wrote: > I'm personally happy to comply with this for any future commits, but wonder > if you've considered the arguments against commit signing [1]? Note > especially the reference therein to Linus' original negative opinion on > signed commits [2]. Yes, I've read it. But would his alternative, signing tags, really help us more here? How would that work? How would we have to structure the process? At least signed commits are easy to integrate into the current development process with github - only a different way of merging has to be used. > I came across these when searching for a way to enable signing by default, > e.g. a `git config` option that might allow for this. Unfortunately, there > isn't one, meaning it's likely that most folks will forget to do this most > of the time. I'll remind people if they forget to do it, but I won't require it. As you say, that would be an extra barrier, and I'm not suggesting this because I to see people jumping through bureaucratic hoops. But it is a pretty simple thing to do... > If you're really serious about it, you should probably reject pull requests > without signed commits; otherwise, signing becomes meaningless because only > honest authors do it, and forgetful or malicious ones can avoid it without > penalty. This is not because I'm afraid of malicious authors, but because I want to reduce the risk that github hacks would pose. Something to watch for would be authors that normally sign pull requests/merges and suddenly don't. Someone malicious may have gained access to their github account. This just adds an extra layer of protection. Cheers, Wladimir