<oembed><type>rich</type><version>1.0</version><author_name>npub16dt55fpq3a8r6zpphd9xngxr46zzqs75gna9cj5vf8pknyv2d7equx4wrd</author_name><author_url>https://nostr.ae/npub16dt55fpq3a8r6zpphd9xngxr46zzqs75gna9cj5vf8pknyv2d7equx4wrd</author_url><provider_name>njump</provider_name><provider_url>https://nostr.ae</provider_url><html>📅 Original date posted:2016-03-02&#xA;📝 Original message:On Wed, Mar 02, 2016 at 02:56:14PM +0000, Luke Dashjr via bitcoin-dev wrote:&#xA;&gt; To alleviate this risk, it seems reasonable to propose a hardfork to the &#xA;&gt; difficulty adjustment algorithm so it can adapt quicker to such a significant &#xA;&gt; drop in mining rate.&#xA;&#xA;Having a well-reviewed hard fork patch for rapid difficulty adjustment&#xA;would seem to be a useful reserve for all sorts of possible problems.&#xA;That said, couldn&#39;t this specific potential situation be dealt with by a&#xA;relatively simple soft fork?&#xA;&#xA;Let&#39;s say that, starting soon, miners require that valid block header&#xA;hashes be X% below the target value indicated by nBits. The X% changes&#xA;with each block, starting at 0% and increasing to 50% just before block&#xA;420,000 (the halving). This means the before the halving, every two&#xA;hashes are being treated as one hash, on average.&#xA;&#xA;For blocks 420,000 and higher the code is disabled, immediately doubling&#xA;the effective hash rate at the same time the subsidy is halved,&#xA;potentially roughly canceling each other out to make a pre-halving hash&#xA;equal in economic value to a post-halving hash.&#xA;&#xA;Of course, some (perhaps many) miners will not be profitable at the&#xA;post-halving subsidy level, so the steady increase in X% will force them&#xA;off the network at some point before the halving, hopefully in small&#xA;numbers rather than all at once like the halving would be expected to do.&#xA;&#xA;For example, if the soft fork begins enforcement at block 410,000, then&#xA;X% can be increased 0.01% per block. Alice is a miner whose costs are&#xA;24BTC per block and she never claims tx fees for some reason, so her&#xA;profits now are always 25BTC per block. During the first difficulty&#xA;period after the soft fork is deployed, the cost to produce a hash will&#xA;increase like this,&#xA;&#xA;    0: 0%           500: 5%         1000: 10%       1500: 15%       2000: 20%&#xA;    100: 1%         600: 6%         1100: 11%       1600: 16%&#xA;    200: 2%         700: 7%         1200: 12%       1700: 17%&#xA;    300: 3%         800: 8%         1300: 13%       1800: 18%&#xA;    400: 4%         900: 9%         1400: 14%       1900: 19%&#xA;&#xA;Somewhere around block 417, Alice will need to drop out because her&#xA;costs are now above 25BTC per block.  With the loss of her hash rate,&#xA;the average interblock time will increase and the capacity will decrease&#xA;(all other things being equal). However, Bob whose costs are 20BTC per&#xA;block can keep mining through the period.&#xA;&#xA;At the retarget, the difficulty will go down (the target goes up) to&#xA;account for the loss of Alice&#39;s hashes. It may even go down enough&#xA;that Alice can mine profitably for a few more blocks early in the new&#xA;period, but the increasing X% factor will make her uneconomical again,&#xA;and this time it might even make Bob uneconomical too near the end of&#xA;the period. However, Charlie whose costs are 12BTC per block will&#xA;never be uneconomical as he can continue mining profitably even after&#xA;the halving. Alice and Bob mining less will increase the percentage of&#xA;blocks Charlie produces before the retarget, steadily shifting the&#xA;dynamics of the mining network to the state expected after the halving&#xA;and hopefully minimizing the magnitude of any shocks.&#xA;&#xA;This does create the question about whether this soft fork would be&#xA;ethical, as Alice and Bob may have invested money and time on the&#xA;assumption that their marginal hardware would be usable up until the&#xA;halving and with this soft fork they would become uneconomical earlier&#xA;than block 420,000. A counterargument here is such an investment was&#xA;always speculative given the vagaries of exchange rate fluctuation, so&#xA;it could be permissible to change the economics slightly in order to&#xA;help ensure all other Bitcoin users experience minimal disruption during&#xA;the halving.&#xA;&#xA;Unless I&#39;m missing something (likely) I think this proposal has the&#xA;advantage of fast rollout (if the mechanism of an adjusted target is as&#xA;simple as I think it could be) in a non-emergency manner without a hard&#xA;fork that would require all full nodes upgrade (plus maybe some SPV&#xA;software that check nBits, which they probably all should be doing&#xA;given it&#39;s in the block headers that they download anyway).&#xA;&#xA;-Dave&#xA;&#xA;P.S. I see Tier Nolan proposed something similar while I was writing&#xA;     this. I think this proposal differs in its analysis to warrant a&#xA;     possible duplicate posting.</html></oembed>