rich1.0npub1uvtfvcegcn9kds68r8he57emc480vqtx8t22kpsctxgjxae44gvsksaxrthttps://nostr.ae/npub1uvtfvcegcn9kds68r8he57emc480vqtx8t22kpsctxgjxae44gvsksaxrtnjumphttps://nostr.ae📅 Original date posted:2013-04-01 📝 Original message:On 2 April 2013 00:10, Will <will at phase.net> wrote: > The threat of a SHA1 collision attack to insert a malicious pull request > are tiny compared with the other threats - e.g. github being compromised, > one of the core developers' passwords being compromised, one of the core > developers going rogue, sourceforge (distribution site) being compromised > etc etc... believe me there's a lot more to worry about than a SHA1 > attack... > > Not meaning to scare, just to put things in perspective - this is why we > all need to peer review each others commits and keep an eye out for > suspicious commits, leverage the benefits of this project being open source > and easily peer reviewed. > Very good points, and I think you're absolutely right. But just running the numbers, to get the picture, based of scheiner's statistics: http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2012/10/when_will_we_se.html We're talking about a million terrahashes = 2^60 right? With the block chain, you only have a 10 minute window, but with source code you have a longer time to prepare. Couldnt this be done with an ASIC in about a week? > > Will > > > On 1 April 2013 23:52, Melvin Carvalho <melvincarvalho at gmail.com> wrote: > >> >> >> >> On 1 April 2013 20:28, Petr Praus <petr at praus.net> wrote: >> >>> An attacker would have to find a collision between two specific pieces >>> of code - his malicious code and a useful innoculous code that would be >>> accepted as pull request. This is the second, much harder case in the >>> birthday problem. When people talk about SHA-1 being broken they actually >>> mean the first case in the birthday problem - find any two arbitrary values >>> that hash to the same value. So, no I don't think it's a feasible attack >>> vector any time soon. >>> >>> Besides, with that kind of hashing power, it might be more feasible to >>> cause problems in the chain by e.g. constantly splitting it. >>> >> >> OK, maybe im being *way* too paranoid here ... but what if someone had >> access to github, could they replace one file with one they had prepared at >> some point? >> >> >>> >>> >>> On 1 April 2013 03:26, Melvin Carvalho <melvincarvalho at gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>>> I was just looking at: >>>> >>>> https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=4571.0 >>>> >>>> I'm just curious if there is a possible attack vector here based on the >>>> fact that git uses the relatively week SHA1 >>>> >>>> Could a seemingly innocuous pull request generate another file with a >>>> backdoor/nonce combination that slips under the radar? >>>> >>>> Apologies if this has come up before ... >>>> >>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> Own the Future-Intel&reg; Level Up Game Demo Contest 2013 >>>> Rise to greatness in Intel's independent game demo contest. >>>> Compete for recognition, cash, and the chance to get your game >>>> on Steam. $5K grand prize plus 10 genre and skill prizes. >>>> Submit your demo by 6/6/13. http://p.sf.net/sfu/intel_levelupd2d >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> Bitcoin-development mailing list >>>> Bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net >>>> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development >>>> >>>> >>> >> >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> Own the Future-Intel&reg; Level Up Game Demo Contest 2013 >> Rise to greatness in Intel's independent game demo contest. >> Compete for recognition, cash, and the chance to get your game >> on Steam. $5K grand prize plus 10 genre and skill prizes. >> Submit your demo by 6/6/13. http://p.sf.net/sfu/intel_levelupd2d >> _______________________________________________ >> Bitcoin-development mailing list >> Bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net >> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development >> >> > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: <http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20130402/7b3c7f99/attachment.html>