rich1.0npub10vqyu8x3f0lfttk98xc28ppuyufaz4df8x4aspa9w9xz5z05snzq7t058yhttps://nostr.ae/npub10vqyu8x3f0lfttk98xc28ppuyufaz4df8x4aspa9w9xz5z05snzq7t058ynjumphttps://nostr.ae📅 Original date posted:2020-01-13 📝 Original message:Thanks for the useful comments guys. I understand where you are coming from, but my PoV is from the deep embedded side. On Mon, Jan 13, 2020 at 06:39:28AM +0000, Andrew Chow wrote: > ... In fact, I'm not quite > sure what kind of attack you are trying to defend against with this > proposal. I don't have a specific attack in mind, but these signatures, if adopted by the community at large, will allow detection of-, and could mitigate damage from-, some broad "bug-classes". Consider if the PSBT Signer (hardware wallet) has bugs. Perhaps if you tweak the PSBT in some unnatural way it produces output that reveals the private key (duplicate k-value perhaps), or corrupts the display of the transaction in helpful (to the attacker) ways (typically case: output hidden as change). Seeing a corrupted file signature would alert you of the attempt to do this. So maybe you don't transmit the transaction, maybe you warn the user and so on. What happens next is up to you, but at least we know something is happening. There could also be bugs in the Combiner/Finalizer which the MiTM wants to trigger. Legimate files, signed by the PSBT Signer, will not contain those attacks, so are "safer" to process, even if your Combiner's PSBT parser has bugs or is tragically dumb. It's just another layer of security and confidence, on top of the existing system-level security (which is already excellent). > If there is a MiTM who can modify your PSBT, then they can just modify > the result the signed PSBT to drop the auth signatures. Yes, the MiTM can remove the signatures. However, if your tools expect and require the signatures in place, then the feature is working as intended, because the user will be alerted to the funny-business. More importantly: nothing has been lost by implementing the feature, and Coldcard (and other PSBT Signers) have to be first to implement it. > ... then you already > have a signature there that covers everything your auth signature would > cover. So just verify those signatures instead; for any inputs with That's just it, when we receive a signed PSBT, at present we don't know *what* was signed without a complete understanding of the transaction, the input UTXO (at least syntactially), and PSBT file contents. If there are bugs in that understanding (ie. checks we all know are needed, but no-one actually implemented) then we might transmit an harmful transaction, or continue to process a file that has been corrupted-with-intent by a MiTM. > Lastly, IMO, if you want MiTM protection, then you should do your > protection with out of band communication. Just PGP sign the PSBT (or > something similar) and send the signature along separately. It's fine to say that, but in an embedded environment, with very limited memory like the Coldcard, PGP isn't an option (signing vs. signature verification). I want to leverage the existing crypto and PKI that we already have in play. > On 1/11/20 3:17 PM, Dmitry Petukhov via bitcoin-dev wrote: ... [many valid points, repeated by Andrew] ... > > If there is MitM, checking something at Finalizer is likely too > > late - the party that can intercept PSBTs can finalize before the > > legitimate Finalizer and broadcast the transaction. Yes, that is a problem which is proposal does not address. If the MitM has control over both directions, in and out, then whatever he or she was trying to do will still happen. Personally, I'm okay with that as a limition, but using the same signatures features, and a pre-shared public key between the PSBT Creator and the Signer, we could block the Signer from looking at MitM'ed files. (The Signer would require and verify incoming unsigned PSBT to contain the last-output-section-signature thing.) I'm not planning on supporting that on the Coldcard (at least not yet), but with the proposed additions, it is possible to do without further changes to the PSBT spec. > > Participants can work from the same PSBT ... > > either pass two files (original and updated), or work out which fields > > (key-value blobs) to remove to get the 'source' PSBT (which might not be > > trivial with presense of proprietary and unknown fields). Even if you > > know which key-value pairs to remove, there is no requirement for > > ordering of the fields, and some signer can serialize them in different > > order after dserialize/sign/add-signatures/re-serialize operation. ... > > Introducing additional ordering or other structure requirements over > > simple key-value structure will add complexity to PSBT processing, and > > adding complexity on such a basic level should have really serious > > reasons, because that increases effort required for even basic > > implementations and increases chance of bugs. I want these signatures to protect against PSBT parsing bugs. That's why they are byte-level on the whole file contents, and not based on sub-sections of the file or various fields inside the file. Yes, there are non-linear PSBT paths that will be difficult or impossible to support with this approach. I would not expect implementations to do anything fancy to reconstruct PSBT contents, I think they would just track the complete file. In most setups today the Creator, Combiner and Finalizer are the same device, and they are desktop systems with gigs of memory. > > If there is some authority on the 'correctness' of 'original' PSBT > > (all particpants receive same PSBT at the start), particpants should > > check the signature by that authority. That authority might use > > the key used only for authentication, and not in the tx signing. Yes, this can be acheived by pre-sharing a public key with the Signer (described above). Only signed incoming PSBT's would be accepted. That key doesn't have anything to do with the blockchain or value transfer. > > I think you do not need to wait for officially-assigned key numbers, > > and can just implement the scheme you envision with proprietary keys, > > document and promote it. Then if it shows its usefulness, it will > > either become de-facto standard with your proprietary keys... Yes, 100% ... but I value the list's feedback, and I would prefer to start with a legitimate key number which I don't need to change later. It's a non-breaking change and I wouldn't propose it otherwise. --- Peter D. Gray || Founder, Coinkite || Twitter: @dochex || GPG: A3A31BAD 5A2A5B10 On Mon, Jan 13, 2020 at 06:39:28AM +0000, Andrew Chow wrote: > I agree with Dimitry. I don't see the point of having the MiTM > protection within the PSBT structure itself, in addition to the fact > that adding new fields is largely unnecessary. In fact, I'm not quite > sure what kind of attack you are trying to defend against with this > proposal. > > If there is a MiTM who can modify your PSBT, then they can just modify > the result the signed PSBT to drop the auth signatures. Furthermore, any > modifications to scripts or UTXOs would just result in an invalid > signature, so only time is wasted. But you'll just waste time anyways > when you see a failed auth sig. > > Additionally, when a signer processes a PSBT, it will either accept the > PSBT and add a signature for its inputs, or reject it and do nothing. > Given this behavior (and I assume you aren't going to add auth sigs for > rejected PSBTs because that doesn't make any sense), then you already > have a signature there that covers everything your auth signature would > cover. So just verify those signatures instead; for any inputs with > signatures, everything you need to verify them are already there. > > Lastly, IMO, if you want MiTM protection, then you should do your > protection with out of band communication. Just PGP sign the PSBT (or > something similar) and send the signature along separately. > > Andrew > > On 1/11/20 3:17 PM, Dmitry Petukhov via bitcoin-dev wrote: > > > > I am not sure that this particular task should be done with data > > embedded in PSBT itself, and not with some sort of container that > > includes PSBT and the authentication information. > > > > The benefit seems to be in reusing PSBT structure for compatibilty, and > > this might be a valid way, although I do not agree with some of your > > points. I elaborate below: > > > >> 1) In the PSBT globals section, a signature over the "source" PSBT > >> file. It would cover all the bytes of the original PSBT file, as > >> it was received by the Signer. > > > > The problem of authenticating the contents of PSBT is independent of > > the signing action. PSBT might be altered on the path from Creator to > > Signer. Therefore you cannot always say that Signer will be an > > authority over 'correctness' of PSBT. > > > >> - At the end of the signing process, the Finalizer should check all > >> the Signers have worked from the same PSBT file (assuming that's > >> the flow expected) > > > > If there is MitM, checking something at Finalizer is likely too > > late - the party that can intercept PSBTs can finalize before the > > legitimate Finalizer and broadcast the transaction. > > > > Participants can work from the same PSBT file if they all receive the > > same PSBT, and not working in chain where next particpant receives > > updated PSBT from the previous participant. Otherwise they will need to > > either pass two files (original and updated), or work out which fields > > (key-value blobs) to remove to get the 'source' PSBT (which might not be > > trivial with presense of proprietary and unknown fields). Even if you > > know which key-value pairs to remove, there is no requirement for > > ordering of the fields, and some signer can serialize them in different > > order after dserialize/sign/add-signatures/re-serialize operation. > > > > Introducing additional ordering or other structure requirements over > > simple key-value structure will add complexity to PSBT processing, and > > adding complexity on such a basic level should have really serious > > reasons, because that increases effort required for even basic > > implementations and increases chance of bugs. > > > > If there is some authority on the 'correctness' of 'original' PSBT > > (all particpants receive same PSBT at the start), particpants should > > check the signature by that authority. That authority might use > > the key used only for authentication, and not in the tx signing. > > > > If particpants send PSBT in chain after adding their signatures, then > > each participant can add their signature to say 'the contents > > of PSBT after my updates should match this hash'. > > > > The signatures of previous participants in the chain most likely do not > > matter because of difficulty of restoring the contents of PSBT as it > > was before the previous particpant, if you do not pass _all_ the PSBTs > > (which is excessive). > > > >> 2) In the output section, specifically, the last key/value pair of > >> the last output of the transaction, I want to add a similar signature, > >> again signed by one of the keys used in the signing process. This > >> signature will cover all the bytes of the resulting (signed) PSBT > >> up to that point. Because it is the last output of the output > >> section, that signature will be the last few bytes of the PSBT file. > >> By "appending" the signature in this way, it's easier to validate > >> and create the signature, without blanking the signature area during > >> digest step. > > > > This will introduce unnecessary higher-level structure to PSBT for the > > reasons that I do not find strong enough for the amount of complexity > > added. > > > > Also, as I said above, you likely do not need more than one > > signature - if this is 'fan-out' scheme, then participants need do > > check the sig of authority that created PSBT; if this is piggy-back > > chain, then only previous particpant's signature is easily verifiable. > > > >> ## Next Steps > >> > >> I'd like to get two officially-assigned BIP-174 key numbers assigned > >> for these two signatures, and then I will see that it gets added > >> into Coldcard's firmware immediately. In time, other tools are > >> welcome to take advantage of these checks. I will also write a BIP > >> for this, and/or make an addition to BIP-174. > > > > I think you do not need to wait for officially-assigned key numbers, > > and can just implement the scheme you envision with proprietary keys, > > document and promote it. Then if it shows its usefulness, it will > > either become de-facto standard with your proprietary keys (and > > everyone will want to support 'Coldard PSBT auth' or whatever the name), > > or the scheme will have serious grounds to be converted to standard and > > have non-proprietary keys assigned. > > > > // Dmitry. > > _______________________________________________ > > bitcoin-dev mailing list > > bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org > > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > > > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... 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