rich1.0npub139lamalg6mww4czepk75anugudczcglp8p9ej9kafmkvgxyk4uus7mvj0jhttps://nostr.ae/npub139lamalg6mww4czepk75anugudczcglp8p9ej9kafmkvgxyk4uus7mvj0jnjumphttps://nostr.ae📅 Original date posted:2021-04-23 📝 Original message: I propose a simple mitigation to increase the capital requirement of channel-jamming attacks. This would prevent an unsophisticated attacker with low capital from jamming a target channel. It seems to me that this is a *free* mitigation without any downsides (besides code-writing), so I'd like to hear other opinions. In a commitment transaction, we trim dust HTLC outputs. I believe that the reason for the 483 HTLC limit each side has in the spec is to prevent commitment tx's from growing unreasonably large, and to ensure they are still valid tx's that can be included in a block. If we don't include dust HTLCs in this calculation, since they are not on the commitment tx, we still allow 483 (x2) non-dust HTLCs to be included on the commitment tx. There could be a configurable limit on the number of outstanding dust HTLCs, but the point is that it doesn't affect the non-dust throughput of the channel. This raises the capital requirement of channel-jamming so that each HTLC must be non-dust, rather than spamming 1 sat payments. Interested in others' thoughts. Eugene (Crypt-iQ) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: <http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/attachments/20210423/28a7f555/attachment.html>